Western University

Scholarship@Western
Business Publications

Business (Richard Ivey School of Business)

4-2018

Industry Tournament Incentives
Zhichuan Li

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iveypub
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the
Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons

Citation of this paper:
Li, Zhichuan, "Industry Tournament Incentives" (2018). Business Publications. 35.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iveypub/35

Industry Tournament Incentives
Jeffrey L. Coles
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Zhichuan (Frank) Li
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We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the
compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar
(industry, size) firms. We find that firm performance, firm risk, and the riskiness of firm
investment and financial policies are positively associated with the external industry pay
gap. The industry tournament effects are stronger when industry, firm, and executive
characteristics indicate high CEO mobility and a higher probability of the aspirant executive
winning. (JEL G31, G32, G34, J31, J33, L25)
Received October 21, 2012; editorial decision March 26, 2017 by Editor Laura Starks.

Prior empirical work has indicated that tournament incentives, specifically the
size of the tournament prize, affect the performance of professional golfers
(Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990, Brown 2011), race-car drivers (Becker and
Huselid 1992), and football coaches (Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce 2006), and the
risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers (Brown, Harlow, and Starks
1996; Chen, Hughson, and Stoughton 2011). Further, internal tournament
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Industry Tournament Incentives

1 In a tournament setting, multiple agents compete for a fixed number of ordered slots. In golf and auto racing, this

means winning the match or race and the associated monetary and other prizes. In a company, the mechanism can
be a “horse race” for promotion, and the winning executive receives a prize, such as higher pay, perquisites, and
status in the new position (Vancil 1987; Lorsch and Khurana 1999; Naveen 2006). Moreover, given the optionlike character of tournaments, some competitors in the tournament will have an incentive to select actions that
increase risk, thereby increasing the probability of winning the tournament (e.g., Chen, Hughson, and Stoughton
2011).
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incentives appear to provide senior executives in a firm with the incentive
to increase firm performance and risk (Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009;
Kini and Williams 2012; Burns, Minnick, and Starks 2017).1
We apply the primary elements of the logic on tournament incentives for
executives inside companies in a novel fashion, specifically to the tournament
incentives arising outside the firm in the external labor market for managers.
We measure external tournament incentives by the pay differential between
one firm’s CEO and the highest-paid CEOs within a group of similar firms that
operate in the same product market(s). Our main hypothesis is that high pay
and/or other desirable characteristics of the CEO position at other companies
in the same or related industries will provide incentives to CEOs at their own
companies. If a CEO leads a company that delivers outstanding performance,
through high quantity or quality of managerial input or perhaps from taking risk
on behalf of shareholders, then that CEO is more likely to be a strong candidate
for the industry prize, specifically a more desirable position leading another
company. Such a position can be attractive because of high compensation,
enhanced span of control, high visibility, and status as CEO of a leading
company in the industry. Precisely along these lines, based on 401 survey
responses from CEOs of U.S. companies, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal
(2005) report that over 75% of CEOs assert that upward mobility in the labor
market is more important than the compensation scheme at the CEO’s own firm
in influencing their own managerial decisions.
In terms of mobility and the tournament prize, there are formal mechanisms,
such as the formation of peer groups for benchmarking executive pay, that
provide information to top executives on compensation at other firms (e.g.,
Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen 2011). Of course, peer group comparisons are
intended to set pay at the CEO’s own firm rather than induce movement to
greener pastures. But executives do move, particularly when they perform well.
Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that executives who jump to CEO positions at new
employers come from firms that exhibit above average stock price performance.
They find that this relation is more pronounced for more senior executives and
that no such relation exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Focusing on CEOs
with prior CEO experience in another firm, Gudell (2010) shows that they earn
a higher level of total compensation than those with no prior CEO experience,
future compensation is positively related to prior performance, and with each
move compensation almost doubles.
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Notwithstanding the above, there are some grounds for skepticism regarding
our central hypothesis. Aggarwal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2006) argue that
internal candidates for a vacant CEO position tend to be favored over external
candidates. They find this effect in the data after controlling for candidate
qualifications (skill, talent, and experience). Indeed, a large proportion of CEO
hires come from inside the firm (68% according to Cremers and Grinstein
2011). This could suggest that when the external labor market is not very
active, external tournament incentives are small or absent and have little power
to explain firm performance and risk. On the other hand, executives could
obtain part of the external tournament prize, at least the portion that appears
in the form of an increase in compensation, even without switching firms. The
potential external opportunity would put pressure on the current firm’s board to
increase the compensation of the sitting CEO, in which case the CEO need not
move to extract benefits from the external opportunity. Mechanisms for this
extraction include peer benchmarking (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen 2011)
and the board’s counter offer to an actual or anticipated external offer to the
CEO. Thus, the external pay gap would provide tournament incentives that
would affect firm performance and risk even if the CEO does not depart.
These arguments frame our empirical question. To what extent do industry
tournament incentives matter? Focusing on internal tournament incentives,
Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) examine performance and Kini and
Williams (2012) study risk-taking. In a similar manner, we test the hypotheses
that firm performance and risk-taking positively depend on the extent to which
CEOs face significant industry tournament incentives in the labor market for
managers.
We construct two measures of industry tournament incentives, both based on
the gap between CEO compensation at the firm of interest and maximal or nearmaximal CEO compensation potentially available among firms that are similar
based on product market and firm size. Based on a GMM specification with
instrumental variables, we find that firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s
q, is significantly positively related to both measures of industry tournament
incentives. For a one-standard-deviation increase in the CEO external pay gap,
q of the CEO’s own firm increases by an average of 0.34, as compared to the
sample mean q of 2.23.
Likewise, firm risk, as measured by the variance of daily stock returns, is
significantly positively related to instrumented industry tournament incentives.
For a one-standard-deviation increase in the external pay gap, the variance of the
firm’s daily stock returns in the following year increases by 0.004, as compared
to the sample mean of 0.030. For evidence on the mechanisms by which CEOs
increase risk, we examine investment decisions and financial policy. R&D
intensity, firm focus, and leverage all increase in the external industry pay gap,
while capital expenditure decreases in the industry pay gap.
Several empirical matters are noteworthy. First, the CEO’s board of directors
is unlikely to have much control over the external pay gap, which makes it more

Industry Tournament Incentives
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likely that our analyses are not contaminated by endogeneity problems and that
our finding that industry tournament incentives (ITI) are important for firm
performance, risk, and policy is valid. Second, and nonetheless, in addition to
including a wide variety of control variables, CEO-firm fixed effects, and lags,
we further attempt to address endogeneity concerns by employing instrumental
variables and applying GMM in estimation. The two instruments for the CEO
external pay gap are (1) the average compensation of geographically close
CEOs and (2) aggregate CEO pay in the industry. The latter is most strongly
related to the maximal or near maximal end of the pay gap, while the first is
relevant for the pay gap primarily through the specific CEO’s compensation.
Third, our results hold when we control for the internal pay gap, the standard
performance and risk-taking incentives arising from executive compensation
(delta and vega), an analogously defined industry size gap, the CEO pay slice,
and different industry definitions. Finally, we find that the industry pay gap
tends to have a stronger effect on firm performance and risk when industry
and executive characteristics indicate high CEO mobility, in which case the
probability of the CEO capturing some or all of the tournament prize is
higher.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in several respects. First, we apply
the logic of promotion-based tournaments to propose the notion of industry
tournament incentives for CEOs. Elements of this logic appear in Aggarwal,
Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2006), Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009), Kini
and Williams (2012), and Burns, Minnick, and Starks (2017), though none
pursue the notion. In terms of risk-taking, the idea is explicit in the literature
on mutual funds (Brown, Harlow, and Starks 1996; Chen, Hughson, and
Stoughton 2011), but the focus therein has been on that particular form of
financial intermediation. Thus, our primary contribution is to fashion the idea
of industry tournament incentives for corporate CEOs and empirically test the
implications for firm performance, risk, and policy. Second, our analysis builds
on the large prior literature on managerial incentives. Our design considers
together standard compensation-related incentives of the CEO (delta and vega),
the recently examined internal promotion-based tournament incentives, and
external tournament incentives to provide an empirical assessment of the
relative economic importance of the external industry tournament. Third, our
results evoke the importance of the external labor market for managerial
incentives that affect firm performance and risk. This is particularly relevant
for those interested in the ability of shareholders to assemble in concert the
full spectrum of incentive and monitoring devices to maximize firm value.
Fourth, and finally, our results relate to the public controversy over CEO pay.
The industry tournament for CEOs, with the significant pay prize at stake, is a
potential mechanism for upward pressure on CEO pay (Jensen, Murphy, and
Wruck 2004; Bebchuk and Fried 2001; Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005) and for
at least some portion of the volatility of firm stock and accounting returns and
of the riskiness of firm policy.

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

1. Hypotheses and Data

2 An alternative to the classic tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981) is a line of research that focuses on employee

promotion as a signal of ability. This work is based on the work of Waldman (1984), with subsequent contributions
that include Gibbs (1995), Chan (1996), and DeVaro and Waldman (2012). While the classic and signaling
tournament models have differences, such as the role of commitment in setting the structure of the tournament,
in many respects the empirical predictions are similar (see Waldman 2013). For simplicity in illustrating the
incentive effects that are the focus of our empirical design, we employ the traditional approach of Lazear and
Rosen (1981) as adapted by Hvide (2002). At the same time, it is likely that the promotion-signaling approach
also would be an appropriate way to model the external tournament.
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1.1 Hypotheses
In this section we develop our hypotheses. In the two-player tournament setup
of Lazear and Rosen (1981), effort is the only choice variable and it positively
depends on the size of the prize to the winner. Hvide (2002) introduces risktaking into that model and shows that both competitors have the incentive to
choose infinite risk.2 Our approach alters Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Hvide
(2002) in two ways. First, we allow one CEO (the incumbent) to start the contest
with a lead, perhaps in performance or perceived ability, relative to the CEO
who aspires to move up the industry hierarchy. This allows us to place our
model in a managerial labor market with some frictions (see below) and also
to evaluate the effects of tournament incentives as a function of the probability
of winning, as represented by the size of the initial lead. Second, we impose
discreteness on the choice of the risk strategy so as to avoid difficulties in
concavity of the decision problem and unboundedness of the choice of risk.
The tournament prize in the model, the pay gap external to the firm, is the
difference between compensation of the highest-paid (leader) CEO and the pay
of the aspirant CEO. The aspirant earns the prize if the aspirant unseats the
leader. Otherwise the leader retains their position and wins the prize.
Three model implications are most pertinent for our empirical analysis.
First, an increase in the size of the prize, the external pay gap, increases
the aspirant’s effort and expected performance. Second, in any equilibrium
the aspirant prefers and, if feasible, chooses more volatility in the outcome,
while the leader prefers and chooses less. Moreover, the preference for higher
risk by the aspirant is stronger when the prize is larger. Third, increasing the
probability an aspirant can overtake a leader (decreasing the initial lead), all else
equal, amplifies the effect of the tournament prize on the aspirant’s incentive
to perform well. A previous version of this paper supplied a formal model to
convey more precisely the intuition behind our specific hypotheses. For the
interested reader, Coles, Li, and Wang (2017) presents the model.
Two traditional approaches to the managerial labor market potentially can
serve as the setting for industry tournament effects. One tradition argues that
external career concerns and “ex post settling up” in the managerial labor market
reduce agency problems between managers and shareholders. Managers with
superior performance obtain high-wage, external offers, and perhaps board

Industry Tournament Incentives

3 Macauley (1963) and Fama and Jensen (1983) also emphasize the incentive and compliance effects of reputation

in markets. One focus of tests of reputation in the labor market for directors and managers has been on retention
and turnover of top executives. Numerous empirical studies provide evidence on turnover of the top management
team when firm performance is poor (e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Warner, Watts, and Wruck 1988) or when
the firm faces financial distress (e.g., Gilson 1989; Cannella, Fraser, and Lee 1995). Other studies broaden the
question to consider board seats; these studies include Gilson 1989, 1990) on bankruptcy; Kaplan and Reishus
(1990) on dividend cuts; Coles and Hoi (2003) on takeover protection; and Brickley, Coles, and Linck (1999)
on stock and accounting performance.
4 Of course, when the ability to run a company is a specialized asset and if the CEO has significant bargaining

power, even small differences in ability can generate large differences in pay (Rosen 1981; Gabaix and Landier
2008; Pan 2017) and large industry pay gaps.
5 Based on a structural model, Nickerson (2013) finds evidence of a considerable cost, approximately 4.8% of

firm value for the median Execucomp firm, associated with the inability of firms and managers to be optimally
matched in the cross-section.
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seats, while managers with poor performance are dismissed and generate lowwage offers or no outside offers. These external labor market effects help
discipline managers to work in the interests of shareholders (Fama, 1980).3
A second approach focuses on the matching of managers, who differ in
talent, to firms that vary in ways that affect the productivity and value of
talent, such as the size or nature of the asset base. When firm and manager
characteristics are specialized or difficult to duplicate, executives are sorted or
“assigned” to CEO positions based on matching their capabilities and human
capital to the asset base (e.g., Rosen 1982; Tervio 2008). Suppose reassignment
costs are zero; all parties know, without error, the abilities of the CEOs and
the nature and productivity of the asset base to which CEOs are assigned;
executive capabilities (e.g., through learning) and the character of the firm’s
asset base do not change through time; and the level and contractual form
of pay are unaffected by other considerations (such as moral hazard or intrafirm equity concerns). Then firms and executives would be perfectly matched
every time, and, depending on bargaining power, CEOs potentially would be
paid something like the value of their marginal revenue product.4 Executives,
who are correctly assigned and paid, would never move. There would be an
external pay gap, but it would be irrelevant for executive incentives. In contrast,
it is more realistic that executive and firm characteristics are not perfectly
known and matching is imperfect. Then firms would learn about the talent
of potential CEOs through observing their performance in the job slots they
currently occupy. Furthermore, matching can be a dynamic process. Through
time executives can learn by doing and firms can require different skills as the
firm’s strategy and asset base adjust to market conditions. In any case, if the
benefits of rearranging exceed the costs of reassignment, CEOs in the industry
tournament would then be reallocated to firms, based on the updated assessment
of their ability, whenever the home firm does not respond with enough pay and
the benefits of capturing the external pay gap exceed the costs of reassignment.5
We hypothesize that these tournament incentive effects appear in data from
the managerial labor market. In the time series, the effects of variation in the
size of the tournament prize on effort and observable firm performance should

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

Hypothesis 1. Firm performance increases in the size of the industry
tournament prize, as measured by the external pay gap.
Hypothesis 2. To the extent that the trailing CEO can affect risk, then the
stock return volatility and riskiness of investment and financial policies of the
aspirant’s firm increase in the size of the prize.
Hypothesis 3. A higher probability of the aspirant winning the tournament
and capturing the gain increases the incentive effect of the tournament on the
performance, risk, and policy of the aspirant’s firm.

1.2 Data sources
We obtain CEO compensation data from the Standard and Poor’s (S&P)
ExecuComp database, which covers more than 1,500 firms each year including
those that are in the S&P 500, S&P mid-cap 400, and S&P small-cap 600
indices. The sample period is 1992-2005.6 We obtain stock return data from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and firm characteristics from
the Compustat Industrial and Segment files. The sample, excluding financial
and utility firms, aggregates to 17,702 firm-year observations arising from 2,265
unique firms and 4,136 unique CEOs.
ExecuComp provides data on salary, bonus, stock awards, option grants,
and total compensation for named executive officers (NEOs). For total
compensation, we use TDC1, which for 2005 and prior eschews using option

6 Our sample ends in 2005 to avoid data complications associated with the 2006 change in executive compensation

reporting requirements (see Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2013), to allow direct comparison to the results of Kale,
Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009), Kini and Williams (2012), and Cremers and Grinstein (2011), and to avoid
potential mismeasurement of CEO compensation arising from the recent adoption of complex, performancecontingent vesting provisions (Bettis et al. 2010, 2016). We include all firmyears that have an identifiable CEO
(using CEOANN).
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apply to the aspirant CEO. Moreover, through time the CEO should employ a
risky (less risky) strategy if the CEO is the aspirant (leader). In terms of the
cross-section, comparing CEO tournaments that vary only in the size of the
prize, a larger pay gap, using the CEO with maximal pay as the reference point,
will be associated with higher effort from the aspirant CEO and better expected
performance from that firm. Furthermore, the larger the pay gap the stronger
will be the preference of the aspirant CEO for risk and, supposing the aspirant
CEO has some discretion over the choice of risk, the higher aspirant firm risk
will be. In addition, the effects of the tournament prize on firm performance
and risk will be stronger when the probability of the aspirant overtaking the
incumbent and capturing the prize is larger.
The primary hypotheses are as follows.

Industry Tournament Incentives

grant values reported by the companies in favor of using Black-Scholes. Thus,
using TDC1 for 1992-2005 means we can use the same valuation approach for
options across all firms.7

7 TDC1 in ExecuComp has some missing values, in which case we use the individual components reported in

ExecuComp to calculate TDC1. This adds 171 firm-year observations.
8 The details are available from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ftp/Siccodes30.zip.
9 For example, Charles Wang, the CEO of Computer Associates, received a large stock grant in 1998 that brought

his total compensation to $655.45 million. The second-highest CEO pay within the same industry in 1998 was
$43.23 million (Siebel Systems). The lowest CEO compensation in that industry in 1998 was at J. D. Edwards, a
computer software company, with total CEO compensation equal to $140,227. Also, executives often accumulate
unexercised options. For example, former Walt Disney Chairman Michael Eisner, on December 3, 1997, exercised
stock options at a profit of about $565 million, for an abnormally lucrative payday. The exercised options, on 7.3
million shares of stock, had been awarded to Mr. Eisner in contract negotiations in January 1989.
10 Hall and Liebman (1998) find that regression results with CEO compensation as the dependent variable are

sensitive to outliers. Nonetheless, our results are robust to using maximal CEO pay rather than second-highest
CEO pay.
11 As in all calculations herein that partition a sample into subsamples based on the median of a variable, if the

sample contains an odd number of observations, we assign the median firm to the subsample comprised of
observations above the median. If multiple observations tie at the median, we randomly order the tied firms and
assign them in alternating fashion to the above- and below-median groups, starting with the former.
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1.3 Measures of the CEO industry tournament prize
To group firms based on the product market, we apply the Fama-French 30
industry classification (FF30).8 The discussion above suggests that every CEO
in the industry has the incentive to compete for the CEO position in the same
industry with the highest pay and perhaps with other desirable attributes, such
as increased span of control, perquisites, and visibility. An obvious approach is
to define the industry tournament incentive as the compensation gap between
the CEO in question and the highest-paid CEO in the same industry. One
difficulty is that extreme compensation within an industry in a particular year
may be due to an unusual, transitory event, in which case maximal industry CEO
compensation is not likely to approximate what the executive would receive if
were to win the tournament.9 To remove at least some potential outliers, we use
the second-highest CEO pay rather than maximal pay.10 Our first measure of
industry tournament incentives, Indgap1, is defined as the compensation gap
between the CEO under consideration and the second-highest-paid CEO in the
same industry.
Selecting peer groups to form performance percentile benchmarks for CEO
pay is a common industry practice. Moreover, peer groups tend to be comprised
of firms with similar revenue from the same industry (Bizjak, Lemmon, and
Naveen 2008; Faulkender and Yang 2010; Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen
2011). Accordingly, we use net sales to control for firm size. In each year
for each industry, we divide firms into two groups based on whether annual
sales (net of returns, discounts, rebates, and allowances) is above or below
the industry median.11 Based on this sample partition, our second measure of
industry tournament incentive, Indgap2, is the compensation gap between the

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

Table 1
Summary statistics
A. Incentives
Variable
Indgap1 ($000)
Indgap2 ($000)
Firm gap ($000)
CEO delta (per $1)
CEO vega ($000)
CEO total compensation ($000)

Mean

Median

SD

10th pctl

90th pctl

17,282
16,862
16,408
17,702
17,702
17,702

N

24,501.27
14,891.01
3,387.85
0.039
65.363
4,256.6

14,296.71
6,955.97
1,298.98
0.014
32.504
1,966.91

30,036.52
23,676.79
12,692.41
0.071
202.055
11,333.31

3,470.38
1,219.67
232.42
0.001
0
524.678

51,431.32
31,384.01
7,143.43
0.105
148.577
8,906.13

17,702
16,490
17,702
16,490

7.391
55.405
0.103
0.219

17,702
17,702
17,702
17,702
17,702
17,702

91.813
0.016
0.160
0.153
0.723
370.241

63
0.009
0.150
0.11
0.722
206.828

64.921
0.048
0.071
0.129
0.203
376.771

25
0.002
0.092
0.06
0.5
56.234

204
0.040
0.237
0.39
1
869.606

17,304
17,161
17,218
15,729
17,682
17,682
9,547
9,547
17,682
17,676
17,624
17,317
17,626
17,642
17,586
17,612

2.233
7.229
0.030
0.012
0.037
0.064
4.559
0.540
4,787.35
4,228.33
0.191
0.182
0.177
0.302
0.372
0.028

1.647
11.458
0.025
0.007
0.002
0.048
3
0.422
963.978
1021
0.166
0.102
0.091
0.247
0.367
0.047

2.607
27.726
0.021
0.020
0.101
0.061
4.344
0.328
20,173.19
13,215.28
0.186
0.536
0.817
0.218
0.129
0.149

1.036
−9.626
0.015
0.002
0
0.014
1
0.166
172.597
159.231
0
−0.360
−0.106
0.064
0.220
−0.057

3.778
25.086
0.049
0.026
0.113
0.131
12
1
9,819.99
2,975.60
0.410
0.739
0.440
0.637
0.526
0.114

B. CEO characteristics
7
55
0
0

3.985
7.822
0.304
0.414

3
45
0
0

13
65
0
1

C. Industry characteristics
Ind # CEOs
Ind stock return vol
Industry homogeneity
Industry mobility
Industry talent
Ind CEO comp ($000,000)
D. Firm characteristics
q
ROE (%)
Stock return vol
EBITDA vol
R&D
CAPEX
# segments
H-index
Total assets ($000,000)
Sales ($000,000)
Book leverage
Stock return (1 yr)
Sales growth
Capital investment
CEO pay slice
FCF

This table presents summary statistics for ExecuComp firms, excluding financials and utility firms, from 1992
to 2005. We provide incentive measures in panel A, CEO characteristics in panel B, industry characteristics
in panel C, and firm characteristics in panel D. See Table A1 (the appendix) for variable definitions. The
industry tournament incentive measures and industry instruments are based on the Fama-French 30 industries
classification. All calculations, including those in panel C, are based on firm-year observations. All variables
related to firm characteristics are winsorized at 1% and 99%.

CEO and the second-highest paid CEO in the same size-industry group.12 For
both measures, the notion is that the tournament incentive is larger when the
“promotion” prize is bigger and the gap is wider.
Panel A in Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The industry pay gap
measures accord with the substantial level and dispersion of compensation

12 For both Indgap1 and Indgap2, we exclude CEOs with a negative pay gap, meaning the highest-paid CEO in

each industry or in each sized-based half industry. Our results are almost identical if, instead, we define the pay
gap as zero for those highest-paid CEOs and include those observations.
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CEO tenure (years)
CEO age (years)
New CEO
Retire CEO

Industry Tournament Incentives

awards to CEOs over the sample period. The median (mean) of our first measure
of industry pay gap, Indgap1, using second-highest CEO pay within an industry
as the benchmark is $14.3 million ($24.5 million). As expected, the industry
pay gap conditional on the same size group, Indgap2, is substantially smaller
than Indgap1. Both measures of the industry tournament prize substantially
exceed the median (mean) CEO pay of $1.97 million ($4.26 million).13

1.5 Internal tournament incentives, delta, vega, and other control
variables
Prior studies using U.S. data have documented the empirical effects of withinfirm tournament incentives for firm value (Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009)
and risk (Kini and Williams 2012). Burns, Minnick, and Starks (2017) find
a positive relation between firm value and the internal pay gap for non-U.S.
firms.14 We follow these studies to calculate Firm gap as the difference between
CEO total compensation and median VP total compensation.15 Vice presidents
(VPs) are the group of (up to) four named executive officers who are not CEO.
This variable captures the increase in a median VP’s compensation if she wins
the internal promotion tournament. As panel A of Table 1 indicates, the median
(mean) within-firm pay gap for our sample is $1.30 million ($3.39 million),
which is similar to that reported by Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) and
Kini and Williams (2012). Note that the internal pay gap is dwarfed by the prize
in the external tournament.
13 Gillan et al. forthcoming find that backfill bias in the Execucomp data causes overrepresentation of high-growth

companies that experienced high, low-risk returns. Moreover, managers whose data are backfilled tend to have
lower salaries, lower total compensation, and higher ownership. It is possible that any biases in CEO pay and
maximal CEO pay offset each other in construction of our measures of the pay gap. On the other hand, to the
extent that our measures of the external pay gap are affected by such biases, our results should be interpreted
with care.
14 Burns, Minnick, and Starks (2017) also find that the tournament structure itself varies across firms based on

country characteristics, including cultural variables, as well as on firm characteristics.
15 Like Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) and Kini and Williams (2012), we eliminate cases with negative Firm

gap. The regression results are almost identical if, instead, we assign a value of zero and include the observations.
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1.4 Dependent variables: Performance, risk, and policy
To measure firm performance (or value) we employ Tobin’s q, defined here as
the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt to total
assets. The sample mean and median for q are 2.23 and 1.65. As for firm risk,
we define Stock return vol as the variance of one year of daily stock returns.
Mean and median Stock return vol are 0.030 and 0.025, respectively.
Indicators of the riskiness of firm investment policy include: R&D, defined as
R&D expenditures divided by total assets; CAPEX, capital expenditures divided
by total assets; # segments, the number of operating segments (Compustat
segment database); H-index, the sum of the square of segment sales divided by
the square of firm sales (the Herfindahl index in firm sales); and Book leverage,
which is book value of interest-bearing debt divided by total assets.

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

2. Instruments and Other Variables Related to the Industry Tournament
Prize
We argue that the industry pay gap provides tournament-based incentives for
managers to improve firm performance and to increase risk. In performance-onstructure and structure-on-structure regression specifications, however, omitted
variables, measurement error, and simultaneity or reverse causation are general
concerns (e.g., Coles, Lemmon, and Wang 2011) that are likely to be relevant for
our specific empirical questions. One potential line of attack is to supplement
a comprehensive set of control variables and fixed effects with instruments.
Thus, we estimate a first stage using instrumental variables, control variables,
and fixed effects to predict the industry pay gap for each CEO in each year. The

16 For direct stock ownership and restricted stock, we compute the number of shares of stock held by the executive

divided by the number of shares outstanding. For stock options, we follow Yermack (1995) to compute the
option delta from the Black-Scholes option-pricing model (the change in the value of the stock option for a one
dollar change in the stock price) multiplied by the ratio of the number of options held to total shares outstanding.
Following Core and Guay (1999), we separately compute option deltas for new option grants and existing
options. For newly granted options, we assume a maturity of seven years because executive stock options are
generally exercised early (Carpenter 1998; Huddart and Lang 1996; Bizjak, Bettis, and Lemmon 2003). For
existing options, we assume that unexercisable options (those that are not vested) have a maturity of six years
and that exercisable (vested) options have a maturity of four years. The dividend yields and volatility estimates
for each firm year are given in ExecuComp. The risk-free rate is from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank website.
See Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006, 2013) on calculating pay level, delta, and vega using ExecuComp.
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Also note that there is a mechanical relation between the external and internal
tournament incentive measures. Holding all else constant, for each dollar
that CEO pay rises, the external (internal) pay gap falls (rises) by a dollar.
Nonetheless, the correlations among the internal and two external tournament
incentive measures are positive in the cross-section, which suggests that some
of the economic forces that determine each are distinct.
We control for other incentive variables previously established to
be empirically relevant. For managerial incentives arising from CEO
compensation structure, we calculate CEO delta and vega. In computing these
measures, we include direct stock ownership, restricted stock, and existing
and newly granted stock options, all based on accumulated grants net of
dispositions. CEO delta represents the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm
performance. Per Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), we define CEO delta to
be the change in executive wealth per $1 change in shareholder wealth. CEO
vega is the change in the value of the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01 change in the
annualized standard deviation of stock returns.16
In most specifications, we employ control variables pertaining to CEO
attributes (CEO tenure and CEO age), firm attributes (Stock return 1 yr, Sales
growth, Book leverage, R&D, Capital investment, and FCF), and industry
attributes (Industry stock return vol). See Table A1 (the appendix) for detailed
definitions.

Industry Tournament Incentives

second stage regresses measures of firm performance and risk on the predicted
industry pay gap, controls (excluding the instruments), and fixed effects.

17 While the annual cash bonus and the LTIP typically are a relatively small portion of CEO pay, they are large for

some firms (Murphy 1999). By way of illustration, for 2004 pay to CEOs of large US companies of $6.5 million,
on average (in year 2000 dollars), the LTIP and the annual bonus payouts represented 27%, grant date value of
stock and options comprised 51%, salary was 17%, and other (including pension and benefits) represented 5%.
See Frydman and Jenter (2010).
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2.1 Endogeneity concerns
There are several specific endogeneity concerns. First, the industry pay gap
potentially is influenced by firm performance and risk. TDC1 (Execucomp) is
comprised of salary, annual bonus, other annual pay (including perquisites and
benefits), total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options
granted, long-term incentive payouts (LTIP), and all other pay (such as tax
reimbursements and signing bonuses). While salary tends to be set based on
performance over the prior year, some of the other components of pay can be
affected by contemporaneous performance and risk.
For example, the annual cash bonus schedule often is based explicitly on
market or accounting performance in that year (Murphy 1999). Furthermore,
long-term incentive cash payouts are based on a performance period longer than
one year, so if the executive is in the last year of that period, then performance in
that year can affect the LTIP payout. Thus, high performance in that same year
is likely to cause an increase in CEO cash compensation. This would lead to a
reduction of the gap between maximum pay in the industry and the pay of the
CEO and, therefore, would spuriously reduce the estimated relation between
performance or value and the industry tournament incentive (ITI).17
Second, and likewise, to the extent that the payout schedule for an annual
bonus scheme or expiring LTIP award is convex in performance, an increase in
contemporaneous risk will increase the expected payout in that year, thereby
reducing on average the industry pay gap. Some annual bonus schemes and
LTIP award schedules are convex for at least some of the performance domain
(Murphy 1999). If executives are immediately able to change policy and
increase risk in response to ITI, and if the annual bonus and expiring LTIP
are significant components of pay, then estimates of the effect of the external
pay gap on firm risk can suffer from a spurious negative relation between risk
and the industry pay gap.
One approach to reverse causation is to employ lags. In the specifications
explaining firm risk, we lag the industry pay gap measure by one year.
This addresses the causation problem associated with the annual bonus and
expiring LTIPs. Because Tobin’s q is forward looking, insofar as it contains the
present value of anticipated future performance, for the models explaining firm
performance, we use contemporaneous values of q and the ITI. Nonetheless,
q also can depend on current performance, so some concern about reverse
causation remains.

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

2.2 Instruments for the industry pay gap
We utilize two instruments for the external pay gap. First, for each CEO-firmyear we calculate the average compensation of geographically close CEOs.
Per Bouwman (2011), we expect the average compensation of geographically
close CEOs to be positively associated with the total compensation of aspirant
CEOs.18 To the extent that pay in one location is associated with general
conditions in the market for executives, this measure also should be associated
with maximal or second-highest CEO pay in the industry. If the former effect
dominates, the instrument will be negatively related to the industry pay gap.
We follow Bouwman (2011) to construct Geo CEO mean as average total
compensation received by all other CEOs of firms headquartered within a
250-km radius of the firm.19
In terms of the exclusion condition, we do not expect the average level
of pay for geographically close CEOs to affect firm performance or risk,
except through industry tournament incentives. Submitting this assertion to
further inspection, one concern is that production technology or investment
opportunities might be correlated with geographic location for some types
of firms, such as mining firms that colocate near mineral deposits or hightech firms spawned from top universities nearby. On the other hand, with
18 Bouwman (2011) finds that CEO pay is related to the pay of geographically proximate CEOs in their reference

group. Likewise, Kedia and Rajgopal (2009) argue competition for employees causes firms to grant more stock
options to rank-and-file workers when a higher percentage of geographically close firms grant more options.
Also see John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2011) on the impact of geography on agency costs and payout policy.
19 We obtain the location (city) of the headquarters of every firm in the sample from Compustat and latitude and

longitude data from the Census 2000 U.S. Gazetteer. We exclude the 33 firms with headquarters outside the
United States. Since Compustat assigns the latest headquarters location to all years, we verify the headquarters
location for every firm over the entire sample period using 10Ks (and other financial documents, if needed)
and correct the location if necessary. We also confirm that city names correspond with the names found in the
Gazetteer “places” files and correct the name when needed. When we do not find a city name in the Gazetteer file
(90 instances), we check the location of the city on maps.google.com and assign the observation to the nearest
place on the Gazetteer file within a 15-km radius of the original location. We estimate the actual distance between
cities with the Haversine formula, which gives great-circle distances between two points on a sphere.
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Third, in terms of omitted variables, it is likely that growth opportunities
affect both of the dependent variables, firm performance and risk, and
our primary explanatory variable, the external pay gap, through CEO
compensation. For example, firms with extraordinary growth opportunities
are likely to demand extraordinary talent and skill on the executive team and
to pay accordingly. Further, the position of CEO at a firm with high growth
opportunities is likely to be demanding and require higher pay. Including a
common proxy for growth opportunities, Tobin’s q, does no good because we
use it as a key outcome variable. Lagged q is unsuitable because investment
opportunities (and q and the need for talent) are persistent. Fortunately, other
proxies for growth opportunities and the need for talent are available. We use
R&D intensity, investment in hard assets, and sales growth, as well as CEO-firm
fixed effects, to capture growth opportunities.

Industry Tournament Incentives

20 If modified industry CEO pay indeed is a strong predictor of each CEO’s pay, the contemporaneous mechanism

is likely to be common factors in the labor market, rather than causal effect from one CEO’s pay to the pay
of another CEO (whether maximal or nonmaximal). The most direct connection from one CEO’s pay to the
pay of another likely would be the peer benchmarking process, as administered by the HR director and board
compensation committee, often with the assistance of a compensation consultant. Through this process, the pay
of industry peers from the prior year, not the current year, with a growth or inflation factor applied (e.g., 5%),
translates lagged peers’pay into benchmarks used to set pay in the current year. See Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen
(2011), Faulkender and Yang (2010), and Murphy (1999). Rather, our measure of the industry ability to pay is
meant to capture the contemporaneous correlation of pay and to exclude any causal effect from lagged peer pay
and performance to the current pay of the CEO.
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modern communication and transportation (distribution) technologies, many
firms have broad geographic span and operate and compete on a national or
global basis. Thus, there should be at most a weak link between the location
of a firm’s headquarters and investment opportunities. We further address the
concern through the following means. First, in formulating the instrument, when
calculating average compensation of geographically close CEOs, we exclude all
CEOs in the same industry (FF30). Second, in the GMM IV models we control
for growth opportunities. Third, we employ CEO-firm fixed effects in both
regression stages. These and other controls should increase the likelihood that
this instrument and the other instrument described below satisfy the exclusion
condition. The correlation between Geo CEO mean and Indgap1 (Indgap2) is
−0.28 (−0.23).
The second instrument we consider for the pay gap is a modification of total
CEO pay in the industry. Our measure extends the notion that “fair” wages
for employees depend on a firm’s ability to pay (Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler 1986), so that total industry CEO compensation reflects the ability of
an industry to pay. This is consistent with each CEO being paid more if the
industry ability to pay is higher, which accords with the empirical observation
that when maximal CEO pay is relatively high in an industry other CEOs in
that same industry tend to be highly paid (Dickens and Katz 1986).
To avoid a mechanical relation between industry total compensation and
our industry pay gap measures, when we calculate industry aggregate pay we
exclude both components of the external pay gap, pay of the aspirant CEO at the
firm in question and the “brass ring” (specifically maximal and second-highest
pay in the industry or size-based half-industry). The omissions in construction
mean the instrument varies in the industry across firms. While the proposed
instrument never contains the pay of the CEO in question, common factors
shaping the labor market are likely to cause pay of all CEOs in the industry
to covary with each other and with omitted CEO pay. In terms of the pay gap,
however, it is unclear whether the pay gap would be positively or negatively
related to total industry pay, though we expect the former if near-maximal pay is
more strongly related to total industry pay than is aspirant pay.20 The correlation
between Ind CEO comp and Indgap1 (Indgap2) is 0.52 (0.49). To control for
the possibility that average or aggregate CEO talent in the industry drives both
total pay to CEOs in the industry and firm performance, in the GMM IV models

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

we control for individual CEO experience and firm/CEO performance. Again,
we also include CEO-firm fixed effects in both stages.21
The diagnostics below indicate that both instruments are sufficiently
correlated with one or both of the components of the endogenous regressor, the
external pay gap, after controlling for the exogenous regressors (relevance).
While we argue that both instruments affect firm performance and risk mainly
through their effect on the industry pay gap, we fully acknowledge the
difficulties in identifying proper instruments that satisfy exclusion.22 Readers
should apply appropriate caution in interpreting the results.

2.4 CEO mobility and the industry prize
If executives are mobile and the firm wishes to retain the CEO, the firm will set
pay higher to prevent departure and the external pay gap will be lower, all else
equal. In contrast, if CEO immobility makes preemptive raises or equilibrating
pay adjustments unnecessary, firms can set CEO pay so as to be less than fully
responsive to growth in peer firm pay benchmarks, so the external pay gap
potentially would be larger
We employ two CEO-level proxies for CEO mobility. First, the probability
of turnover for a new CEO should be lower. Second, when a CEO is close to
retirement, the likelihood of an immediate promotion to another firm in the
same industry is also lower. New CEO equals 1 in the CEO’s first year of

21 In terms of Ind CEO comp satisfying exclusion, a potential concern arises if executives view the market as

providing multiple upside and downside tournaments. If so, then the top end of the pay gap for one or more of
the nonmaximal upside tournament gaps is a component of the proposed instrument. For downside gaps, the
instrument can contain compensation figures representing the potential loss if the executive were to be displaced
downward. On the other hand, in both the upside and downside instances, the ends of the wage gap all enter
the measure as positive numbers, rather than in a way that represents the tournament pay gaps. Thus, while the
instrument is related to a collection of tournaments, it is unclear as to whether the aggregation of the ends of
the wage gaps weakens the argument that the second instrument satisfies exclusion. Moreover, CEO-firm and
year fixed effects should account to some extent for variation of CEO position in the industry hierarchy and the
number of upside and downside tournaments for the CEO. We empirically assess multiple upside and downside
tournaments in the Internet Appendix.
22 We also consider product market demand or competitiveness as a potential candidate for an instrument. In

unreported regressions, we use the Herfindahl index of sales in the industry as a proxy for product market
competitiveness and find it is not strongly related to the industry pay gap. Moreover, Giroud and Mueller (2011)
show that firms in noncompetitive industries have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower
firm value. Thus, product market competitiveness seems unlikely to satisfy exclusion and surely does not satisfy
relevance.
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2.3 Other factors that affect the industry tournament prize
We follow prior research (Graham, Li, and Qiu 2011; Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen 2006) in selecting the observable firm and manager characteristics
that determine the level of CEO compensation. Variables include firm size,
performance, and sales growth, industry volatility, and CEO tenure and age. At
the industry level, we control for the volatility of industry performance and the
number of CEOs (firms) in the industry comparison group.

Industry Tournament Incentives

2.5 Findings on the determinants of the industry tournament prize
Table 2 presents our findings on the “determinants” of the industry pay gap.
All regressions in the table are pooled time-series, cross-sectional regressions
with instruments, CEO-firm and year fixed effects, and observable firm, CEO,
and industry characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 report results for the baseline
specifications. Columns 3 and 4 include additional controls for CEO mobility.

23 First, we assign firms in the CRSP monthly returns file to their respective Fama-French 30 industries classification

code and then regress each firm’s prior 60 monthly returns on an equally weighted monthly industry index and
the market return. For each firm in each year, we then compute the partial correlation coefficient between the
firm’s returns and the industry index while holding market returns constant. Industry homogeneity is the average
partial correlation coefficient for all firms within an industry. We use a 5-year rolling estimation period for each
year in the sample.
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service as CEO (0 otherwise). Retire CEO equals 1 if the CEO is older than 65
(0 otherwise).
At the industry level, frictions, such as information costs and the fixed costs
of repeatedly but imperfectly solving the assortative matching problem, for
example, should reduce executive mobility in the industry (Nickerson, 2013).
Restated, lower frictions should imply an active and competitive labor market
for CEOs and higher CEO turnover rates, all else equal. To measure industry
mobility in the CEO labor market, we calculate the annual unconditional
probability of CEO turnover in each industry (Industry Mobility). We define a
turnover event if a CEO in one year is not the same person in the next year.
In addition, Cremers and Grinstein (2011) argue that firms that require more
firm-specific human capital will promote from within, implying that CEOs
in such industries are less likely to be replaced by outsiders. This limits the
potential outside options of the CEO, which likely diminishes the incentive
effect of the industry tournament prize. Following Cremers and Grinstein
(2011), we measure the firm-specific talent in each industry by the percentage of
insider CEOs in each industry per year (Industry talent). Along the same lines,
the likelihood of hiring an outsider as CEO is higher when firms operate in
homogeneous industries (Parrino 1997). We follow Parrino (1997) to construct
Industry homogeneity, which measures the similarity among firms within an
industry after isolating market effects.23
The number of firms (and corresponding CEO positions) in an industry
potentially reflects the degree of competition for those slots. Competition
among more candidates for more positions is likely to compress the variation
in CEO pay, the gap in pay between the maximum and minimum and, more
generally, the gap between the industry maximum and pay at a given firm. On
the other hand, more CEOs in the same industry could be associated with larger
variation in pay, perhaps due to randomness in performance and thus pay, in
which case the typical pay gap need not shrink as the number of firms increases.
Whether the former effect dominates the latter, so as to compress the external
pay gap, is an empirical question.
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Table 2
Determinants of the industry tournament prize
Dependent variable
ln(Indgap1)

ln(Indgap2)

ln(Indgap1)

ln(Indgap2)

CEO delta

−0.567∗∗
(0.245)
−0.127∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.222∗∗∗
(0.053)
−0.066∗∗
(0.028)
−0.012
(0.011)
0.103
(0.069)
−1.013
(1.963)
0.163
(0.680)
−1.271∗∗∗
(0.160)

−0.229∗
(0.122)
−0.220∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.040
(0.075)
−0.106∗∗
(0.044)
0.022
(0.018)
−0.062
(0.096)
−2.548
(2.401)
−0.675
(0.898)
−0.819∗∗∗
(0.211)

2.200∗∗∗
(0.090)
−0.054∗∗
(0.019)
Yes
Yes
15,264
0.144

1.874∗∗∗
(0.144)
−0.100∗∗
(0.045)
Yes
Yes
14,804
0.092

−0.625∗
(0.356)
−0.127∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.209∗∗∗
(0.051)
−0.062∗∗
(0.028)
−0.013
(0.011)
0.127∗∗
(0.076)
−1.407
(2.076)
0.050
(0.658)
−1.279∗∗∗
(0.177)
−0.047
(0.072)
−0.046
(0.083)
0.872
(0.723)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.036
(0.084)
2.121∗∗∗
(0.092)
−0.109∗∗
(0.052)
Yes
Yes
14,732
0.141

−0.559∗
(0.310)
−0.214∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.007
(0.074)
−0.100∗∗
(0.045)
0.017
(0.018)
−0.153
(0.114)
−3.668
(2.561)
−0.353
(0.873)
−0.768∗∗∗
(0.229)
−0.223∗∗
(0.104)
−0.172
(0.129)
1.505
(1.089)
0.003
(0.004)
0.047
(0.134)
1.729∗∗∗
(0.143)
−0.112∗∗
(0.055)
Yes
Yes
14,315
0.080

ln(Firm gap)
ln(Total assets)
Stock return (1YR)
Sales growth
ln(CEO tenure)
ln(CEO age)
Industry stock return vol
ln(Ind # CEOs)
New CEO
Retire CEO
Industry homogeneity
Industry mobility
Industry talent
ln(Ind CEO comp) (IV)
ln(Geo CEO mean) (IV)
Year fixed effects
CEO-firm fixed effects
Observations
Adj. R-squared

This table presents multivariate models of the determinants of industry tournament incentives using data on
ExecuComp firms, excluding financials and utility firms, from 1992 to 2005. The dependent variables are the
natural logarithm of Indgap1(Indgap2) in Columns 1 (2) and 3 (4). Indgap1 is the pay gap between the secondhighest-paid CEO’s total compensation within the same Fama-French 30 industries classification and the CEO’s
total compensation. Indgap2 is the pay gap between the second-highest-paid CEO’s total compensation in the
same industry (FF30) and size group and the CEO’s total compensation. Table A1 (the appendix) defines all
other incentive variables and control variables. We include year and CEO-firm fixed effects in all specifications.
Firm-clustered and Newey-West-corrected (up to four lags) standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

For the baseline results in Columns 1 and 2, the negative coefficients on
CEO delta and the internal pay gap suggest that firms factor in the industry
tournament when designing the pay structure of their own CEOs. Perhaps a
higher external tournament incentive makes internal incentives less necessary.
An alternative explanation is that implementing higher CEO delta requires
larger stock and option grants and, thus, higher pay and a lower external gap.
Also note that the CEO’s pay defines the lower and upper edges of the external
and internal pay gaps, respectively, so there is a mechanical negative relation
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Explanatory variables

Industry Tournament Incentives

3. Industry Tournament Incentive Effects
3.1 Industry tournament incentives and firm performance
Hypothesis 1 suggests a positive relation between firm performance and
external tournament incentives. Because of the endogeneity concerns
delineated above, on the right-hand side we use the predicted industry pay gap.
We use GMM IV because the null hypothesis that there is no heteroskedasticity
based on plain vanilla 2SLS IV is rejected.25 As the dependent variables are
likely to be time-persistent, here and throughout we report firm-clustered and
Newey-West-corrected (up to four lags) standard errors. In order to isolate the
effects of external tournament incentives, we control for CEO delta arising from
the managerial compensation contracts, NEO tournament incentives internal
to the firm, growth opportunities, and other variables. In all regressions, we
include year and CEO-firm fixed effects.
Table 3 reports estimates of the relation between industry tournament
incentives and firm performance. The dependent variable is contemporaneous

24 The results of Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) and Kini and Williams (2012) suggest that firms set a higher

internal promotion-based tournament prize when the probability of winning the tournament is lower. This direct
connection appears to be more tenuous for the external industry pay gap. The likely reason is that the firm does
not have the discretion to set the industry maximum CEO pay, firm CEO pay, and promotion probability in a
coordinated way.
25 We perform Pagan and Hall’s (1983) test of heteroscedasticity. For both Indgap1 and Indgap2, p <0.001.
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between the two gaps. CEO pay increases in firm size (Murphy 1999), so it
is natural to find that Indgap1 decreases in firm size. In contrast, Indgap2 is
constructed conditional on firm size. Variation across half-industries drives the
association between size and ln(Indgap2). Better firm stock performance is
contemporaneously associated with a lower external pay gap. Neither CEO
age nor CEO tenure is related to the industry pay gap. The industry pay gap is
not related to industry stock return volatility.
The estimated coefficient on the number of CEOs in the industry is
significantly negative in all four models, consistent with competition among
more candidates compressing variation CEO pay. In Columns 3 and 4, we find
little association between the CEO and industry mobility measures and the
industry pay gap. The exceptions are a significantly negative coefficient on
whether the CEO is new for Indgap2 and a significantly positive coefficient on
Industry mobility for Indgap1.24
Turning to our chosen instruments, as expected, the coefficient estimate on
ln(Geo CEO mean) is always negative and is significant at least at the 5% level
in all four specifications. Likewise, the effect on the industry pay gap of industry
“ability-to-pay” (industry total compensation, Ind CEO comp) is positive and
significant at the 1% percent level in all models.
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Table 3
Industry tournament incentives and firm performance
Dependent variable and model type
OLS
Explanatory variables
ln(Indgap1)

q

GMM IV
1st stage
ln(Indgap1))

0.008
(0.005)

Predicted ln(Indgap1)

OLS

2nd stage
q

q

GMM IV
1st stage
ln(Indgap2))

0.237∗∗∗
(0.027)

ln(Indgap2)

0.005
(0.005)

−0.555∗
(0.346)
ln(Firm gap)
−0.127∗∗∗
(0.011)
ln(Total assets)
−0.208∗∗∗
(0.050)
ln(CEO tenure)
0.103∗
(0.059)
ln(CEO age)
0.826
(1.613)
Stock return (1 yr)
−0.065∗∗∗
(0.023)
Sales growth
−0.007
(0.008)
FCF
0.064
(0.168)
R&D
−0.119
(0.195)
Capital investment
−0.261
(0.279)
Industry stock return vol
0.106
(0.749)
−1.301∗∗∗
ln(Ind # CEOs)
(0.148)
ln(Ind CEO comp) (IV)
2.241∗∗∗
(0.082)
ln(Geo CEO mean) (IV)
−0.017∗∗
(0.008)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
CEO-firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
14,946
14,946
R-squared
0.214
0.146
Endogeneity, relevance, and overidentification
2.180
Hansen J -test
42.42∗∗∗
Hausman exogeneity test
First-stage F -statistics
372.34∗∗∗
0.395
(0.769)
0.055∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.332∗∗∗
(0.093)
−0.137∗∗∗
(0.053)
−0.546
(1.414)
0.966∗∗∗
(0.061)
0.079
(0.060)
−0.133
(0.688)
1.765∗∗∗
(0.677)
0.004
(0.392)
2.539
(2.143)
0.056
(0.068)

0.414
(0.682)
0.083∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.350∗∗∗
(0.079)
−0.150∗∗∗
(0.049)
−0.219
(1.172)
0.996∗∗∗
(0.057)
0.079
(0.056)
−0.196
(0.559)
1.703∗∗∗
(0.582)
0.053
(0.363)
1.062
(1.895)
−0.202∗∗∗
(0.067)

Yes
Yes
14,946
0.145

0.054∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.332∗∗∗
(0.092)
−0.143∗∗∗
(0.052)
−0.832
(1.440)
0.978∗∗∗
(0.063)
0.073
(0.057)
−0.001
(0.622)
1.865∗∗∗
(0.624)
0.024
(0.388)
2.295
(2.145)
0.059
(0.071)
0.336
(0.748)

Yes
Yes
14,492
0.217

0.421
(0.538)
−0.216∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.013
(0.068)
−0.062
(0.082)
−2.336
(2.001)
−0.114∗∗∗
(0.041)
0.015
(0.013)
0.153
(0.251)
−0.024
(0.333)
−0.213
(0.429)
−0.697
(0.983)
−0.848∗∗∗
(0.195)
1.901∗∗∗
(0.126)
−0.084∗∗
(0.037)
Yes
Yes
14,492
0.092

0.276∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.097
(0.676)
0.111∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.406∗∗∗
(0.082)
−0.110∗∗
(0.053)
−0.040
(1.235)
1.028∗∗∗
(0.060)
0.069
(0.055)
−0.097
(0.530)
1.747∗∗∗
(0.536)
0.086
(0.370)
0.987
(1.897)
−0.267∗∗∗
(0.075)

Yes
Yes
14,492
0.121

1.871
42.03∗∗∗
115.74∗∗∗

This table presents multivariate regression models of firm performance on industry tournament incentives using
ExecuComp firms, excluding financials and utility firms, from 1992 to 2005. The dependent variable is q , which
is the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and the book value of debt to total assets. Indgap1 is the pay
gap between the second-highest-paid CEO’s total compensation within the same Fama-French 30 industries
classification and the CEO’s total compensation. Indgap2 is the pay gap between the second-highest-paid CEO’s
total compensation in the same industry (FF30) and size group and the CEO’s total compensation. Table A1
(the appendix) defines all other incentive variables and control variables. We include year and CEO-firm fixed
effects in all specifications. Firm-clustered and Newey-West-corrected (up to four lags) standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Predicted ln(Indgap2)
CEO delta

2nd stage
q

Industry Tournament Incentives

26 If the capital markets are reasonably efficient, contemporaneous q should capture at least some of the valuation

consequences of tournament incentives. Moreover, executives will have had to anticipate the industry pay gap,
with the various components of pay to be fully realized at the end of the year, to understand and act upon the
tournament incentive. Two mechanisms contribute to the ability of a CEO to anticipate the industry pay gap. One
is via benchmark data provided by compensation consultants. The compensation consultants provide those data
for the past year and then typically apply a growth factor (e.g., 5%) to construct the benchmarks. To the extent
that pay has persistent components, via uniform time-based vesting schedules for stock and option and long-term
cash, for example, then the benchmarking should give a window into what realized end-of-year pay will be.
Second, public disclosures (10-K, DEF14A) contain information on total compensation, grants of stock and
options and long-term cash, outstanding equity-based awards, options and stock vested, and options exercised.
While prior to the 2006 change in disclosure requirements the reporting was not as reliable or comprehensive as
it is now, we consider it likely that executives still would have had a pretty good idea of what realized pay would
be for executives in their own industry and elsewhere. As an empirical matter, when we estimate forward q as a
function of predicted industry pay gap we get similar results.
27 We use the natural logarithm of the industry pay gap in most regressions. To calculate the economic significance,

we first compute the level of industry pay gap 0.5 standard deviations above and below the mean. We then compute
the difference between the natural logarithm of the high and low industry pay gap and apply the appropriate
coefficient estimate.
28 We repeat the analysis for annual return on equity (ROE) in year t+ 1 as the performance measure, with results

similar in direction, significance, and inference to those reported in Table 3. The GMM IV coefficient on
ln(Indgap1) is 0.012 (p <.01) as compared to the OLS estimate of −0.003. Hansen’s J , Hausman, and F
tests support using GMM IV. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in Indgap1
increases ROE in the next year by 0.021, which represents a sizeable increase in comparison to the median
(mean) ROE in our sample of 0.115 (0.073). For brevity, we do not provide tabular results.
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Tobin’s q.26 The first three columns present results using Indgap1. For ordinary
least-squares (OLS) regressions (Column 1), included here and later as a basis
for comparison, the coefficient on ln(Indgap1) is 0.008, which is statistically
insignificant. Columns 2 and 3 contain results from the two-stage GMM
IV estimation. In the second stage (Column 3), the coefficient on predicted
ln(Indgap1) is 0.237 (p <.01). The Hausman exogeneity test rejects the null
hypothesis that the OLS and GMM IV estimates on ln(Indgap1) are the same
(p <.01). The difference in results is consistent with the notion that better
firm performance and higher firm value shrink the external pay gap, so that
the estimate on ln(Indgap1) is attenuated in the OLS specification through
reverse causation. In contrast, the sign and the magnitude of the coefficient
using GMM IV are consistent with a positive effect flowing from industry
tournament incentives to firm performance. In terms of economic significance,
a one-standard-deviation increase in Indgap1, acting through ln(Indgap1) and
the estimated GMM IV coefficient, increases Tobin’s q by 0.34, which is
economically significant in comparison to the median (mean) Tobin’s q of 1.65
(2.23) in our sample. 27 Based on median (mean) total assets of $964 million
($4.79 billion), this change in q is equivalent to a change in firm value of $327
million ($1.629 billion).
Columns 4-6 in Table 3 report confirmatory results for similar specifications
based on Indgap2. Using GMM IV, the coefficient on ln(Indgap1) in Column 6
is 0.276 (p <0.01). 28 Again, the Hausman exogeneity test rejects the hypothesis
(p <.01) that the OLS and IV estimates are the same. The first-stage F -statistics
for both Indgap1 (372.34) and Indgap2 (115.74) indicate that our instruments

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

3.2 Industry tournament incentives and firm risk
Hypothesis 2 posits that the possibility of being promoted to a “better” firm with
higher compensation gives aspirant executives the incentive to increase firm
risk. Increasing firm risk, through investment or financial policy, for example,
can generate uncertain but potentially extreme performance that increases the
likelihood an aspirant CEO is promoted over peer CEOs.31 Goel and Thakor
(2008) provide a model that addresses this connection between tournament
incentives and corporate risk-taking. The idea also is familiar insofar as Kini and
Williams (2012) find a relation between internal tournament incentives and firm
risk and Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chen, Hughson, and Stoughton
(2011) apply the notion to competition among mutual fund managers.32
As the dependent variable, we employ Vol, defined in percentage terms
as 100 x Stock return vol over calendar year t+ 1. Our primary explanatory
variable is the predicted CEO industry pay gap. In determining firm risk CEOs
29 IV estimation with weak instruments can perform poorly in absolute terms and in comparison to OLS (Stock,

Wright, and Yogo 2002). Table 3 and the subsequent tables report the F test for relevance for the collection of
instruments used in each of the first-stage regressions that support the second stage specifications. We form the
F -statistic based on Kleibergen-Paap-Wald statistics and employ critical values from Stock and Yogo (2005).
30 Given there are more instruments than endogenous regressors, we perform Hansen’s J -test for overidentifying

restrictions, which is the GMM extension of the Sargan test (2SLS). This tests whether all instruments are
exogenous, assuming that at least one instrument is exogenous. In Table 3, neither of the J -statistics is significant
at conventional levels, which suggests that it is unlikely that one instrument satisfies the exclusion condition
while the other does not.
31 Increasing risk in this way also increases the probability of the CEO being far out of the money in the competition

for the tournament prize, but in a winner-take-all tournament losing is the same, regardless of whether it is a
close or distant loss. That said, a CEO potentially can lose her job when performance is extremely poor. Thus,
there is a trade-off between the cost from the increased likelihood of being fired and the benefit from increasing
promotion probability and expected payoff. If the benefits exceed the costs, this trade-off suggests that the chosen
risk level will increase with the magnitude of the prize (pay gap) in the industry tournament.
32 There is a potential countervailing effect. In an industry with big pay gaps, high-paying firms will understand that

low-paid CEOs have strong incentives to take risks. Therefore, when a low-paid CEO delivers strong performance
the high-paying firms realize that this performance was more likely due to luck than skill and the firm will be
less willing to hire the low-paid CEO.
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collectively satisfy the relevance condition, and neither J -statistic rejects the
null.29 , 30
The coefficients on CEO delta (per Columns 3 and 6) tend to be insignificant
when q is the dependent variable, which is consistent with Coles, Lemmon,
and Meschke (2012). The coefficients on internal (VP) tournament incentives
are positive and statistically significant, which provides support for the findings
in Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009). The signs of the coefficients on the
control variables generally are similar to those previously documented (e.g.,
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006).
Overall, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the GMM IV results suggest that a
strong positive relation exists between firm performance and our measures of
the CEO industry tournament prize. It appears that the CEO industry pay gap
provides executives the incentive to perform better.

Industry Tournament Incentives

33 This difference in coefficients is consistent with the omitted variable problem leading to a downward-biased

OLS parameter estimate on the industry pay gap.
34 We repeat the analysis for two alternative measures of firm risk. Accounting volatility is the standard deviation

of abnormal (seasonally adjusted) quarterly EBITDA divided by total assets for the 20 quarters from year t
through year t+ 4. The OLS coefficient on ln(Indgap1) is not different from zero, while the GMM IV coefficient
is positive and significant (p <.03) and the Hausman test rejects the null (p <.01). Based on GMM IV, a onestandard-deviation increase in Indgap1 implies an increase of cash flow volatility of 0.002, versus median (mean)
cash flow volatility of 0.007 (0.012). The second alternative risk measure is idiosyncratic firm risk, measured
by the standard deviation of the residuals from a one-factor, three-factor, or four-factor model using daily stock
returns in the prior 12-month period. The results are qualitatively similar to those based on total firm risk.
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face potential costs of reduced expected utility arising from exposure to risk
through performance-contingent compensation. On the other hand, convexity
in executive compensation can offset the risk exposure arising from CEO delta
to possibly increase the incentive to take risk (Guay 1999; Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen 2006). Thus, we control for CEO delta and vega arising from the
compensation scheme, as well as for VP tournament incentives (per Kini and
Williams 2012), to assess whether industry tournament incentives affect firm
risk.
Based on prior literature (Servaes 1994; Bhagat and Welch 1995; Opler et al.
1999; Nam, Ottoo, and Thornton 2003; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006), we
also control for firm size, Tobin’s q, book leverage, the growth rate of sales,
stock return, and CEO age and tenure. Unobserved variables, such as CEO
risk aversion, are likely to affect both the dependent variable (firm risk) and
independent variable (the industry tournament incentive). For instance, a risktolerant CEO will take more risks and earn more through increased option value,
which leads to a lower industry pay gap. These omitted variable problems work
against finding a positive link between firm risk and industry pay gap. We seek
to mitigate the bias through year and CEO-firm fixed effects and instrumental
variable estimation. Table 4 reports the results. The first (last) three columns
show the results for Indgap1 (Indgap2).
GMM IV (Column 3) gives a significantly positive coefficient of 0.176 on
ln(Indgap1) (p <0.01) that is more than 12 times the OLS estimate in Column
1. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the OLS and GMM IV
estimates on Indgap1 are the same.33 A one-standard-deviation increase in
Indgap1 implies a 0.004 increase in stock return volatility, as compared to a
median (mean) of 0.025 (0.030).34
Columns 4-6 repeat the analysis of the industry pay gap using Indgap2. The
OLS coefficient on Indgap2 is slightly positive and marginally significant (p
<.10), while the GMM IV coefficient is a significantly positive 0.219 (p < .01),
which is more than 30 times the OLS estimate. Again, the Hausman test rejects
the hypothesis that the OLS and GMM IV estimates are equal. The firststage F -statistics for the two industry pay gap measures exceed 90 and are
highly significant (p <.01) and neither J -statistic is significant at conventional
levels.
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Table 4
Industry tournament incentives and firm risk
Dependent variable and model type
OLS
Explanatory variables
ln(Indgap1)

Vol

GMM IV
1st stage
ln(Indgap1))

0.014∗∗∗
(0.004)

Predicted ln(Indgap1)

OLS

2nd stage
Vol

0.176∗∗∗
(0.021)

ln(Indgap2)

Vol

GMM IV
1st stage
ln(Indgap2))

0.007∗
(0.004)

−0.698∗
(0.407)
CEO vega
−0.035∗
(0.021)
ln(Firm gap)
−0.129∗∗∗
(0.012)
ln(Total assets)
−0.245∗∗∗
(0.057)
ln(CEO tenure)
0.156∗∗
(0.075)
ln(CEO age)
−0.547
(1.545)
Stock return (1YR)
−0.009
(0.009)
Sales growth
−0.007
(0.012)
0.001
q
(0.001)
Book leverage
0.571∗∗∗
(0.147)
Industry stock return vol
0.048
(0.789)
−1.254∗∗∗
ln(Ind # CEOs)
(0.168)
ln(Ind CEO comp) (IV)
2.244∗∗∗
(0.096)
ln(Geo CEO mean) (IV)
−0.274∗∗∗
(0.055)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
CEO-firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
12,946
12,946
R-squared
0.397
0.148
Endogeneity, relevance, and overidentification
2.128
Hansen J -test
44.61∗∗∗
Hausman exogeneity test
First-stage F -statistics
272.79∗∗∗

CEO delta

0.559∗
(0.328)
0.008∗∗
(0.004)
−0.007
(0.006)
−0.051
(0.046)
0.002
(0.038)
−0.800
(1.192)
−0.013
(0.018)
0.001
(0.020)
0.007∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.437∗∗∗
(0.153)
3.159∗∗∗
(0.632)
−0.135∗∗∗
(0.051)

0.627∗∗
(0.259)
0.012∗∗
(0.006)
0.014∗∗
(0.006)
−0.028
(0.035)
−0.010
(0.033)
−0.632
(1.119)
−0.007
(0.017)
0.002
(0.023)
0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.343∗∗∗
(0.127)
2.452∗∗∗
(0.634)
−0.337∗∗∗
(0.051)

Yes
Yes
12,946
0.320

0.557∗
(0.332)
0.008∗∗
(0.003)
−0.008
(0.006)
−0.058
(0.047)
0.003
(0.039)
−0.580
(1.185)
−0.010
(0.019)
0.000
(0.020)
0.007∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.468∗∗∗
(0.155)
3.090∗∗∗
(0.632)
−0.130∗∗
0.557∗

Yes
Yes
12,557
0.299

0.321
(0.619)
−0.028
(0.021)
−0.213∗∗∗
(0.015)
−0.028
(0.073)
−0.059
(0.097)
−3.249
(2.125)
−0.012
(0.021)
−0.017
(0.015)
−0.009
(0.005)
0.211
(0.236)
−0.879
(1.037)
−0.788∗∗∗
(0.217)
1.881∗∗∗
(0.140)
−0.587∗∗∗
(0.075)
Yes
Yes
12,557
0.195

0.219∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.465∗∗
(0.189)
0.011∗
(0.006)
0.037∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.075∗
(0.038)
0.033
(0.038)
0.212
(1.069)
−0.004
(0.018)
−0.003
(0.023)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.416∗∗∗
(0.139)
2.504∗∗∗
(0.656)
−0.404∗∗∗
(0.061)

Yes
Yes
12,557
0.323

1.875
47.14∗∗∗
91.67∗∗∗

This table presents multivariate regression models of firm risk on industry tournament incentives using
ExecuComp firms, excluding financials and utility firms, from 1992 to 2005. The dependent variable is Vol
=100 x Stock return vol, where Stock return vol is the standard deviation of one year of daily stock returns in
year t+ 1. Indgap1 is the pay gap between the second-highest-paid CEO’s total compensation within the same
Fama-French 30 industries classification and the CEO’s total compensation. Indgap2 is the pay gap between
second-highest-paid CEO’s total compensation in the same industry (FF30) and size group and the CEO’s total
compensation. Table A1 (the appendix) defines all other incentive variables and control variables. We include
year and CEO-firm fixed effects in all specifications. Firm-clustered and Newey-West-corrected (up to four lags)
standard errors are in parentheses ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

1440

[17:51 23/2/2018 RFS-hhx064.tex]

Page: 1440

1418–1459

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/31/4/1418/3896050 by guest on 06 December 2021

Predicted ln(Indgap2)

2nd stage
Vol

Industry Tournament Incentives

3.3 Alternative explanations
First, higher CEO ability would cause better firm performance, higher CEO
pay, and a higher internal pay gap, but also a lower external pay gap, in which
case we would observe a positive (negative) relation between performance and
the internal (external) pay gap. The significantly positive coefficients on the
external pay gap in Table 3 are inconsistent with CEO ability as an omitted
variable that drives the results. Second, CEO entrenchment is likely to be
associated with lower firm performance, higher CEO pay, a lower external
pay gap, and also a higher internal pay gap. Thus, we should observe a positive
(negative) relation between performance and the external (internal) pay gap.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate a positive relation in both cases. Moreover,
controlling for the CEO pay slice as CEO entrenchment (Bebchuk, Cremers,
and Peyer 2011), the estimated effects of the external tournament incentive on
firm performance and risk-taking remain positive and significant.

35 We estimate the models in Table 4, excluding q and also replacing q with R&D expenditure scaled by total assets,

an alternative measure of growth opportunities, and obtain similar results. Since we are using future firm risk (or
lagged q), we are not as concerned as we would be otherwise with firm risk affecting q . Moreover, q has become
a standard measure of growth opportunities, so using q allows us and the reader to connect our empirical models
and estimates to those in the prior literature.
36 When we use industry fixed effects rather than CEO-firm fixed effects, for both firm performance and risk the

GMM IV coefficients on the primary explanatory variables, our measures of the industry pay gap, almost always
are larger (in absolute value) and have lower p-values. Moreover, the OLS estimates tend to differ somewhat.
For example, in the OLS specifications in Tables 3 and 4 the OLS estimates on the pay gap are negative and
significant. In comparing the OLS results based on industry versus CEO-firm fixed effects, we interpret these
results to indicate that the endogeneity problem that implies spurious negative coefficient estimates on the industry
pay gap is meaningful and that CEO-firm fixed effects, as one would expect, improve on industry fixed effects
to provide a partial solution.
37 It is possible that the industry pay gap implies incentives for risk-taking that exceed those that are suitable

to implement optimal investment and financial policy. In no way, however, does our analysis allow us to
assess whether or not the spectrum of incentive devices, including the internal pay gap, external pay gap,
and performance-contingent pay, implement suboptimal risk-taking.
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The effects of delta and vega on firm risk are positive and mostly significant.
The results on vega are consistent with Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006).
Like in Kini and Williams (2012), the coefficients on the internal pay gap are
significantly positive. Coefficients on growth opportunities, as measured by
Tobin’s q, are positive and significant.35 The signs of the coefficients on the
remaining control variables are generally similar to those documented in prior
literature.
In summary, using GMM IV with controls, CEO-firm and year fixed
effects, and two different measures of the CEO industry pay gap, industry
tournament incentives have a positive effect on firm risk that is economically
and statistically significant.36 These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2
and support the contention that a greater industry tournament incentive leads
to higher risk-taking by aspirant CEOs.37
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Third, both pay and other aspects of employment that comprise the industry
tournament incentive are likely to be associated with firm size differences.
Working for a larger firm likely confers on top executives a broader span
of control over economic assets, more perquisites, and higher status. We
decompose the predicted external pay gap into the portion that arises solely from
differentials in firm size and the remaining that is orthogonal to the size gap. We
find that the component of the instrumented external pay gap that is unrelated
to the size gap has significant explanatory power for firm performance and firm
risk. The above-mentioned results on the CEO pay slice and relative firm size
appear in Tables OA1 and OA2, respectively (see the Internet Appendix).

3.4.1 CEO characteristics that affect CEO mobility and the external
promotion probability. Our proxies for the probability the CEO can capture
externally the gains from a favorable update in perceived ability include whether
the CEO is new (New CEO) and whether the CEO is near retirement (Retire).
In addition, we consider whether the CEO is a founder, the idea being that
founders are less likely to abandon the firm they started.38 Following Bebchuk,
Cremers, and Peyer (2011), the CEO is designated as a founder (Founder =1, 0
otherwise) if the CEO’s tenure reported in ExecuComp indicates that the CEO
held that position prior to the firm’s first listing on CRSP, which is assumed to
be the IPO year. In each year for each measure, we assign CEOs to one of the
two subgroups. For each proxy subgroup, we separately estimate the second
stage GMM IV models for firm performance (per Column 3 in Table 3) and
risk-taking (per Column 3 in Table 4).39
Table 5 shows the results for the three CEO-related proxies for probability
of winning the tournament prize. Panel A (B) considers Tobin’s q (Vol) as

38 An alternative is that founders have low pay and a large gap and also, for various reasons, such as equity

ownership or family considerations, have the incentive to perform well and take risk. This suggests, in contrast
to our hypothesis, that the relation between performance and risk and the gap would be stronger if the CEO is a
founder or member of the founding family.
39 An alternative approach would be to regress firm performance and risk on the external pay gap and the pay gap

interacted with the indicator for each subgroup. We have not taken this alternative approach because we have
not generated suitable instruments for the interaction terms. Thus, so that we continue to benefit from using
instruments to predict the external pay gap, we estimate performance and risk as a function of the instrumented
pay gap for each partition (subgroup) of the data.
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3.4 The probability of winning and the strength of tournament incentives
We argued in Section 1.1 that the likelihood of the aspirant displacing an
incumbent affects the industry tournament incentive. Hypothesis 3 asserts that
a higher probability of winning increases the incentive effect of a given external
pay gap. Lower labor market frictions, higher industry mobility, and executive
and firm characteristics that permit job switching are likely to be associated
with a higher likelihood, all else equal, of the aspirant being able to displace
an incumbent.

Industry Tournament Incentives

Table 5
Industry tournament incentives conditional on the probability of winning as measured by CEO
characteristics
A. Firm performance

Dependent variable and data partition
q

Explanatory variables

New CEO=0

q

New CEO=1
0.034
(0.067)
−0.051
(0.823)
0.065∗∗∗
(0.017)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,574
0.184
0.00∗∗∗

B. Firm risk

0.281∗∗∗
(0.036)
1.344∗∗
(0.593)
0.112∗∗∗
(0.010)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,564
0.229

New CEO=0

0.152∗∗∗
(0.018)
CEO delta
0.521∗∗
(0.264)
CEO vega
0.004
(0.005)
ln(Firm gap)
0.011∗∗
(0.006)
Other control variables
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
CEO-firm fixed effects
Yes
Observations
10,967
R-squared
0.402
Wald χ 2 test for predicted ln(Indgap1)

Predicted ln(Indgap1)

0.033
(0.036)
0.083
(0.235)
−0.004
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,803
0.258
0.00∗∗∗

Founder =0

Founder =1

0.161∗∗∗
(0.022)
−0.303
(0.373)
0.075∗∗∗
(0.007)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,443
0.226

0.132
(0.095)
1.342∗∗∗
(0.511)
0.011
(0.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,371
0.241
0.08∗

Dependent variable and data partition
Vol

Explanatory variables

Retire=1

Vol
New CEO=1
0.037
(0.077)
0.835
(0.893)
0.418∗∗∗
(0.068)
0.020
(0.019)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,349
0.354
0.00∗∗∗

Retire=0
0.223∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.806∗∗
(0.350)
0.016∗
(0.010)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
9,010
0.415

Vol
Retire=1
0.027
(0.027)
0.308
(0.367)
0.014
(0.011)
0.001
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,306
0.366
0.00∗∗∗

Founder =0
0.132∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.574∗
(0.293)
0.006
(0.005)
0.010∗
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
9,167
0.404

Founder =1
0.054
(0.051)
−0.722∗∗∗
(0.250)
0.064∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.004
(0.012)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,014
0.399
0.04∗∗

This table presents GMM IV regressions (second stage only) of firm performance and risk on industry tournament
incentives for subgroups based on CEO characteristics that affect the probability of winning the tournament. The
sample covers all ExecuComp firms, excluding financials and utility firms, from 1992 to 2005. The dependent
variables are q (panel A) and Vol (panel B), Vol =100 x Stock return vol, where Stock return vol is the standard
deviation of one year of daily stock returns in year t+ 1. Indgap1 is the pay gap between the second-highestpaid CEO’s total compensation within the same Fama-French 30 industries classification and the CEO’s total
compensation. New CEO is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the CEO’s first year of service in the new firm, and 0
otherwise. Retire is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO’s age is more than 65 years, and 0 otherwise. Founder
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO held that position prior to appearing on CRSP, and 0 otherwise. In
each year, we assign firms into one of the two subgroups based on whether the dummy variable for each proxy is
1 or 0. Table A1 (the appendix) defines all other incentive variables and control variables. We include year and
CEO-firm fixed effects in all specifications. Firm-clustered and Newey-West-corrected (up to four lags) standard
errors are in parentheses ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

the dependent variable. The proxies for probability of winning the industry
tournament perform fully as predicted. For firm performance, for example, the
coefficient on instrumented ln(Indgap1) is positive but insignificant when the
CEO has recently assumed office, but positive, twice as large, and significant
when the CEO is not new. The Wald chi-square test rejects the equality of
the coefficients across the two subgroups. Likewise, the coefficient on the
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0.240∗∗∗
(0.029)
CEO delta
0.487
(0.421)
ln(Firm gap)
0.101∗∗∗
(0.009)
Other control variables
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
CEO-firm fixed effects
Yes
Observations
12,793
R-squared
0.228
Wald χ 2 test for predicted ln(Indgap1)

Predicted ln(Indgap1)

q

Retire=0

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

3.4.2 Industry characteristics that affect CEO mobility and the external
promotion probability. To further assess Hypothesis 3, we now consider
whether industry characteristics associated with the probability of capturing
externally the gains from a favorable update in perceived ability shape the
incentives arising from the industry pay gap. We partition the sample based on

40 ExecuComp identifies the executive who is the CEO (variable CEOANN) and the year in which the CEO

was appointed (variable BECAMECEO). For firms with missing data on one or more of BECAMECEO and
CEOANN, we inspect the proxy statement in that year and the previous year to ascertain whether the CEO is
new. The percentage of new CEOs that come from outside the firm is similar to that documented by Denis and
Denis (1995) and Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001).
41 This figure for internally promoted CEOs will be biased downward if the insider already received the pay increase

prior to the promotion or has additional benefits beyond pay after taking the job (e.g., the new CEO is a member
of the founding family).
42 Gudell (2010) argues that the incidence of serial CEOs is increasing and also suggests that significant implicit

incentives, through career concerns of the sort associated with external industry tournament incentives, apply
with particular force to serial CEOs.
43 Other potential elements of the prize are the increase in span of control and enhanced status associated with

working for a larger firm. Of the 249 new CEOs who served as CEO for the prior employer, 186 (74.6%) move
to a larger firm with an average increase in assets of 4.13% ($26.45 million).
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tournament incentives measure is significantly larger when the CEO is not in
the impending retirement group and when the CEO is not a founder. Similarly,
for firm risk-taking, we find stronger tournament effects for firms with CEOs
who are not brand new, CEOs not of retirement age, and CEOs who are not the
founder.
Potential interfirm mobility of top executives is an important ingredient in the
industry tournament. To frame and provide additional support for our analysis of
external tournament incentives, we characterize the attributes of CEOs newly
hired from other S&P 1500 firms in the period 1992 to 2005.40 Out of 575
outside new CEOs, 249 of them were CEO at a previous employer. The other
326 (56.7%) new CEOs served in at least one senior management position at
their prior company.
We argue that part of the prize in the industry tournament is the pay increase
an executive receives by moving. Of the 249 new CEOs who were CEO at
one or more previous employers (serial CEOs), 184 (or 74%) benefit from an
increase in total compensation, with an average dollar increase of $11.8 million.
By way of comparison, a CEO hired from inside the firm receives an average
increase in pay of $0.90 million.41 For the remaining 65 outside new serial
CEOs who do not receive increased pay, we find that 43 (66%) did not leave
the prior company voluntarily. For the other 22 voluntary turnovers in which
the new CEOs did not receive a pay increase, 12 (55%) moved to a larger
firm. These calculations, combined with evidence from Gudell (2010), suggest
that there exists a substantial financial reward for new CEOs with prior CEO
experience.42 , 43

Industry Tournament Incentives

3.5 Industry tournament incentives and manager decisions
We now assess the potential avenues through which the CEO industry pay gap is
associated with firm risk by exploring the relation between industry tournament
incentives and the riskiness of investment and financial policy. We hypothesize
that aspects of financial and investment policy that increase firm risk, such as
R&D intensity, firm focus, and book leverage, will increase in the industry pay
gap, while the relation will be negative for investment in hard assets. We use
two measures for firm focus, the Herfindahl index for firm sales by industry
and the number of operating segments.
Table 7 reports the GMM IV results. In all five specifications the estimated
coefficient on Indgap1 has the predicted sign and three estimates are significant
at least at 5%. R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage increase in industry
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the industry measures constructed in Section 3.4. Our first proxy is Industry
mobility. Holding pay at the firm constant, the industry tournament should
have no effects on incentives if managers cannot move. For example, the
industry tournament will be irrelevant if new CEOs come exclusively from
inside the firm. We use Industry talent to measure the likelihood that CEO
successors are insiders. By a similar logic, we also use Industry homogeneity,
because the likelihood of hiring an outsider as CEO is higher in homogeneous
industries (Parrino 1997) in which firm-specific human capital is less material
and general human capital is most relevant for firm performance. Finally, we
consider the number of CEOs, or identically the number of firms, in each
industry (Ind #CEO). One possibility, holding constant the probability that any
given CEO vacates their position, is that more potential CEO slots implies more
vacancies in expectation, so that the executive is in more tournaments and the
incentive effects of external pay gap(s) will be stronger. On the other hand, more
CEOs also implies more competitors for each slot, so the net effect becomes
an empirical question. To summarize, the effect of the industry tournament
incentive should be stronger in industries with higher Industry mobility,
lower Industry talent, higher Industry homogeneity, and possibly larger
Ind #CEO.
To test these predictions, in each year, we split the industries into two
subgroups based on whether each of the four proxies is above or below the
sample median and then separately estimate the second stage of GMM IV
regressions in Table 3 (for performance) and Table 4 (for risk-taking) across
the two subgroups. Panel A (B) of Table 6 reports the results with q (Vol) as
the dependent variable. The evidence supports Hypothesis 3. For example, in
industries where Industry mobility is low and CEOs move less frequently, the
tournament has little effect on either q or Vol, whereas the estimated effects
are large and significant when executives are more mobile. Likewise, we
find weaker results in industries with more inside CEOs, a lower degree of
homogeneity, and fewer CEO positions in the industry.
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Table 6
Industry tournament incentives conditional on probability of winning as measured by industry
characteristics
A. Firm ferformance

Dependent variable and data partition
q
Ind. homo.

Explanatory variables
Predicted ln(Indgap1)
CEO delta
ln(Firm gap)

High

Low

High

q
Talent
Low

q
#CEO
High

Low

High

0.102∗
0.337∗∗∗ 0.067
0.205∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.041
0.080∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.057)
(0.047)
(0.040)
(0.039)
(0.045)
(0.036)
(0.014)
(0.098)
0.276
0.654
0.072
0.655
0.436
0.832
0.582∗∗
0.279
(0.292)
(0.617)
(0.259)
(0.565)
(0.295)
(0.568)
(0.257)
(0.756)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
0.040
0.052
0.048
0.094
0.050
0.119
0.048
0.140∗∗∗
(0.006)
(0.015)
(0.006)
(0.011)
(0.007)
(0.012)
(0.005)
(0.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,814
8,553
4,545
9,822
8,943
5,424
8,443
5,922
0.256
0.252
0.241
0.244
0.316
0.253
0.357
0.290
0.06∗

B. Firm risk

0.02∗∗

0.00∗∗∗

0.03∗

Dependent variable and data partition
Vol
Homo.

Vol
Mobility

Vol
Talent

Vol
#CEO

Explanatory variables

Low

High

Low

High

Low

High

Low

Predicted ln(Indgap1)

−0.014
(0.026)
0.375∗
(0.195)
0.083∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.023∗∗∗
(0.008)
Yes
Yes

0.287∗∗∗
(0.034)
−0.173
(0.194)
0.012∗∗
(0.005)
0.015∗∗
(0.007)
Yes
Yes

−0.025
(0.037)
−0.003
(0.197)
−0.005
(0.004)
0.033∗∗∗
(0.010)
Yes
Yes

0.115∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.054
(0.186)
0.084∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.001
(0.007)
Yes
Yes

0.264∗∗∗
(0.033)
0.251
(0.198)
−0.006
(0.004)
0.054∗∗∗
(0.009)
Yes
Yes

−0.093∗∗∗
(0.026)
−0.021
(0.187)
0.090∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.007)
Yes
Yes

0.018
(0.019)
0.685∗
(0.365)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.010
(0.007)
Yes
Yes

Yes
5,035
0.352

Yes
7,281
0.417

Yes
3,976
0.333

Yes
8,340
0.416

Yes
7,593
0.336

Yes
4,723
0.422

Yes
7,355
0.321

CEO delta
CEO vega
ln(Firm gap)
Other control variables
Year fixed effects
CEO-firm fixed
effects (FF30)
Observations
R-squared
Wald χ 2 test for
predicted ln(Indgap1)

0.00∗∗∗

0.00∗∗∗

High
0.362∗∗∗
(0.047)
0.505
(0.364)
0.035∗∗
(0.016)
0.037∗∗∗
(0.009)
Yes
Yes

0.00∗∗∗

Yes
5,103
0.519
0.01∗∗∗

This table presents GMM IV regressions (second stage only) of firm performance and risk on industry tournament
incentives for subgroups based on industry characteristics that affect the probability of winning the tournament.
The sample covers all ExecuComp firms, excluding financials and utility firms, from 1992 to 2005. The dependent
variables are q (panel A) and Vol (panel B). Vol =100 x Stock return vol, where Stock return vol is the standard
deviation of one year of daily stock returns in year t+ 1. Indgap1 is the pay gap between the second-highestpaid CEO’s total compensation within the same Fama-French 30 industries classification and the CEO’s total
compensation. Ind. homo., Industry homogeneity; Mobility, Industry mobility; Talent, Industry talent; and #CEO,
Ind #CEO. For each of the four proxies, in each year, we split the sample into two subgroups based on whether the
industry in which the firm operates is below (low) or above (high) the sample median. Table A1 (the appendix)
defines all other incentive variables and control variables. We include year and CEO-firm fixed effects in all
specifications. Firm-clustered and Newey-West-corrected (up to four lags) standard errors are in parentheses
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

tournament incentives, while capital expenditures and segments decrease.44
The results for all five models are similar using Indgap2. In terms of economic
44 Compustat does not report segment data for many firms prior to 2002, so we have fewer observations when

using H-index or the number of segments as the dependent variable. If a firm does not report R&D expenditures
or capital expenditures, we assume the value to be zero (per Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles 1993). One reason for
failure to report is that the company does not spend a “material” amount on R&D. As a check, we have conducted
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Other control variables
Year fixed effects
CEO-firm fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Wald χ 2 test for
predicted ln(Indgap1)

Low

q
Mobility

Industry Tournament Incentives

Table 7
Industry tournament incentives and investment and financial policy
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
Predicted ln(Indgap1)

R&D

ln(# segments)

−0.372∗∗∗
(0.086)
3.522∗∗∗
(1.224)
0.061∗∗
(0.031)
0.137∗∗∗
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
12,946
0.060

−0.024∗
(0.012)
−0.531∗∗∗
(0.154)
0.004∗∗
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
Yes
8,233
0.446

0.478
9.92∗∗∗
238.19∗∗∗

1.171
12.69∗∗∗
267.66∗∗∗

H-index
0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.161∗∗
(0.071)
0.002∗
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
8,233
0.459
0.791
13.23∗∗∗
238.78∗∗∗

Book leverage
0.002∗
(0.001)
0.097∗∗∗
(0.033)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
12,946
0.027
1.6574
8.21∗∗∗
54.11∗∗∗

This table presents GMM IV regressions (second stage) of firm investment and financial policy on industry
tournament incentives using ExecuComp firms, excluding financials and utility firms, from 1992 to 2005. The
dependent variables are R&D, CAPEX, ln(# segments), H-index, and Book leverage. All dependent variables
are measured in year t+ 1 R&D is R&D expenditures divided by total assets (in percentage). CAPEX is capital
expenditures divided by total assets (in percentage). ln(# segments) is the natural logarithm of the number of
operating segments as reported in the Compustat segment database. H-index is the sum of the square of segment
sales divided by the square of firm sales. Book leverage is interest-bearing debt divided by total assets. Indgap1
is the pay gap between the second-highest-paid CEO’s total compensation within the same Fama-French 30
industries classification and the CEO’s total compensation. Table A1 (the appendix) defines all other incentive
variables and control variables. We include year and CEO-firm fixed effects in all specifications. Firm-clustered
and Newey-West-corrected (up to four lags) standard errors are in parentheses ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in Indgap1 implies an increase
in R&D intensity of 0.006, compared with average R&D of 0.037, and a
decrease in CAPEX by 0.003, compared with the average of 0.064. The same
increase in Indgap1 implies a decrease of the number of segments by 1.03
(versus the mean of 4.56) and an increase of the industry Herfindahl index of
firm sales by 0.026 (mean H-index is 0.543).
4. Additional Analyses, Robustness Checks, and Discussion
4.1 Time-series variation in the level and effects of industry tournament
incentives
To accommodate time-series variation we include year fixed effects and various
time-varying control variables in the regression models. Variation through time
in labor market conditions for executives, as indicated by trends in executive
pay (Gabaix and Landier 2008), external mobility (Ryan and Wang 2012),
hiring of CEOs from outside the firm (Murphy and Zábojník 2007; Cremers

the analysis omitting all missing R&D values (unless it is coded as “too small to report,” in which case we again
use a zero value). The results are similar.
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0.456∗∗
(0.223)
CEO delta
−1.043
(1.696)
CEO vega
0.006
(0.013)
ln(Firm gap)
0.088∗∗
(0.042)
Other control variables
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
CEO-firm fixed Effects
Yes
Observations
12,946
R-squared
0.025
Endogeneity, relevance, and overidentification
0.035
Hansen J -test
Hausman exogeneity test
12.12∗∗∗
First-stage F -statistics
283.18∗∗∗

CAPEX

The Review of Financial Studies / v 31 n 4 2018

and Grinstein 2011), and CEO turnover rate (Kaplan and Minton 2012), invites
further examination of how the industry pay gap has evolved. As Figure 1A
indicates, the averages of both Indgap1 and Indgap2 climb steadily from 1992
to 2000, followed by a large drop in 2001 and 2002. Figure 1A also shows
that the average industry pay gap is correlated through time with average CEO
compensation.
The industry pay gap varies across firm age and CEO tenure. In Figure 1B,
we depict the average industry pay gap among firms with the same age, which
is measured by the number of years since the firm has been added to the CRSP
database. The plot indicates that the industry pay gap in younger firms is larger
than that in older firms and that, once the firm reaches the age of ten years, the
industry pay gap starts to shrink. This is consistent with the fact that surviving
firms tend to be larger and tend to pay more. Figure 1C tracks the industry
pay gap in CEO tenure. The industry gap increases in tenure initially, but on
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Figure 1
Time-series analysis of industry tournament incentives
This figure presents the time-series pattern for industry pay gap and industry tournament incentive effects for
ExecuComp firms from 1992 to 2005, excluding financials and utility firms. Indgap1 is the pay gap between the
second highest CEO’s total compensation within the Fama-French 30 industries classification and CEO’s total
compensation. Indgap2 is pay gap between the second highest CEO’s total compensation in the industry and
size group and CEO’s total compensation. Vol =100 x Stock return vol, where Stock return vol is the standard
deviation of one year of daily stock returns in year t +1. Indgap1, Indgap2, and CEO total compensation are
averaged across all firms in each year (A). The horizontal axis represents firm age, which is measured by the
number of years since the firm was added to the CRSP database (B). Indgap1 and Indgap2 are then averaged
among firms with the same age. The horizontal axis represents CEO tenure, which is measured by the number
of years as firm’s CEO (C). Indgap1 and Indgap2 are then averaged among CEOs with the same tenure. The
vertical axis on the left side is the coefficient of the industry pay gap (Indgap1) based on the GMM IV regressions
in Table 3 (q) and Table 4 (Vol) (D). To obtain the coefficients over time, we interact the industry pay gap with
year dummies (using 1992 as the benchmark). The coefficient of industry pay gap in each year, except for 1992,
is the sum of the coefficient of industry pay gap and the interaction term with the matched year dummy. The
vertical axis on the right side of (D) is CEO mobility, which is defined as the annual CEO turnover rate.

Industry Tournament Incentives

4.2 Cross-industry variation in the effects of industry tournament
incentives
Parrino (1997) documents a large variation in firm homogeneity across
industries. Cremers and Grinstein (2011) indicate that the CEO talent pool
(measured by the percentage of internal CEOs hires) varies across industries.
We now explore cross-industry variation in the incentive effects of the industry
pay gap.
To measure the industry tournament incentive in each industry, we reestimate the second stage of the GMM-IV regression models for firm
performance and risk-taking for each Fama-French 30 industries classification,
including Utilities and Financials.46 Table 8 reports the coefficients and
economic magnitude for predicted ln(Indgap1) in Columns 1 and 2 (for
performance) and Columns 3 and 4 (for risk-taking). Industries that reflect
the strongest effects of the external tournament incentive on firm performance
include Retail, Transportation, Business Equipment, Health care, and Clothing.
Industries with the strongest effects on firm risk-taking include Financials,
Food, Retail, and Oil, Petroleum, and Natural Gas. Overall, there seems to
be substantial variation in the effect of industry tournament incentives across
industries. For both performance and risk, the F-test rejects the hypothesis that
the coefficients across industries (FF30) are the same (p <.01).

45 The CEO annual turnover rate for 1999 was 21.5%, which is 35% higher than the sample average. Nevertheless,

when we exclude 1999 from the data, for q , firm risk, and policy, we obtain similar results for the effect of the
external pay gap
46 Due to a small number of firms in some industries, we merge firms in Food Products, Beer and Liquor, and

Tobacco Products together. We combine firms in Mines and Coal for the same reason.
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average starts to decline after a CEO has held the position for over nine years.
This is consistent with the notion CEOs with long tenure have high ability and
the firm increases their pay to retain their talent.
We also assess whether the effects of industry tournament incentives change
over time. To gauge effects through time, we re-estimate the GMM-IV models
for performance (Column 3 in Table 3) and risk-taking (Column 3 in Table 4)
but include predicted ln(Indgap1) interacted with year dummies (using 1992
as the benchmark). In Figure 1D, we depict the coefficient on instrumented
ln(Indgap1) in each year from 1992 to 2005, which is calculated as the sum
of the coefficient on predicted ln(Indgap1) and the interaction term with the
matched year dummy (except 1992). In the same plot, we also include CEO
mobility, which is defined as the annual CEO turnover rate. Figure 1D indicates
that there is time series variation for the annual coefficients and the effect
of industry tournament incentive varies in tandem with CEO mobility. For
example, in 1999, both the coefficients and CEO turnover rate spiked. One
explanation is that executive mobility was very high at the time, which amplified
the incentive effect of the external pay gap.45
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Table 8
Industry tournament incentives across FF30 industries
q on ln(Indgap1)

FF30 industry

Coefficient

Magnitude

q

Vol

0.109∗

0.028

0.435∗∗

0.110

2.257

0.019

0.022
0.296∗∗∗
0.046
0.429∗∗
0.642∗∗∗

0.005
0.077
0.012
0.116
0.121

0.143
0.398∗∗
−0.053
0.117
0.234∗

0.033
0.103
−0.014
0.032
0.044

1.849
1.957
2.095
1.840
3.197

0.033
0.021
0.024
0.028
0.033

0.275
0.079
0.358∗∗

0.060
0.048
0.111

0.049
0.010
0.277∗∗

0.011
0.006
0.086

1.729
1.324
1.569

0.023
0.029
0.025

−0.391
0.195∗∗∗

−0.138
0.051

−0.169
0.375∗∗

−0.059
0.099

1.355
1.828

0.028
0.027

−0.153
0.137∗∗∗
0.259∗∗

−0.037
0.027
0.078

0.011
0.136
0.287∗∗

0.003
0.026
0.086

2.262
1.599
1.542

0.026
0.025
0.021

0.192
0.168∗∗∗
0.098
0.139∗∗
0.715∗∗∗
0.646∗∗∗
0.624
0.141∗∗
0.112∗∗∗
1.179∗∗∗
0.366∗
0.628∗∗

0.095
0.062
0.035
0.082
0.255
0.217
0.170
0.030
0.025
0.294
0.091
0.140

0.030
0.077
0.097
0.984∗∗∗
0.483∗∗
0.056
0.169
0.855∗∗∗
0.369∗∗
0.547∗∗∗
0.285∗
1.026∗∗∗

0.015
0.028
0.035
0.583
0.172
0.019
0.046
0.184
0.082
0.137
0.071
0.229

1.940
1.620
1.221
1.899
3.292
2.754
1.575
1.644
1.538
2.074
1.908
1.403

0.030
0.024
0.017
0.029
0.035
0.040
0.023
0.028
0.027
0.031
0.030
0.023

0.085

0.098

−0.121

1.590

0.025

−0.105

This table reports the coefficient on predicted ln(Indgap1) from GMM IV regressions (second stage) of firm
performance and risk on industry tournament incentives using ExecuComp firms, excluding financials and utility
firms, from 1992 to 2005. The dependent variables are q and Vol. Vol =100 x Stock return vol, where Stock return
vol is the standard deviation of one year of daily stock returns in year t +1. Indgap1 is the pay gap between the
second-highest-paid CEO’s total compensation within the same Fama-French 30 industries classification and the
CEO’s total compensation. Magnitude is measured by the change in q or Vol for a one-standard-deviation increase
in Indgap1 in each industry ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The
average q and Vol in each Fama-French 30 industries classification are reported in the last two columns.

4.3 Robustness to industry definition
We perform the analysis of firm performance and risk using Fama-French 17
(FF17) and 48 (FF48) industry classifications. One possibility is that general
human capital is a primary factor defining the span of the tournament. This
would suggest that FF30 is too narrow and that it is cross-industry differences
that drive differences in the effect of the pay spread on firm performance
and risk. Then moving to the coarser FF17 will attribute variation previously
accommodated by CEO-firm or industry fixed effects to variation in the industry
pay gap. On the other hand, if human capital specific to industries more
narrowly defined than FF30 determines the span of the tournament, moving
instead to FF48 should make the estimated effects stronger as the boundaries
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Food Products, Beer and
Liquor, and Tobacco
Games & Recreation
Books, Printing and Publishing
Household Consumer Goods
Clothing and Accessories
Healthcare, Medical Equip. &
Pharmaceuticals
Chemicals
Textiles
Construction and Construction
Materials
Steel Works
Fabricated Products and
Machinery
Electrical Equipment
Automobiles
Aircraft, Ships and Railroad
Equipment
Mines & Coal
Oil, Petroleum and Natural Gas
Utilities
Telecommunications
Personal and Business Services
Business Equipment
Paper and Business Supplies
Transportation
Wholesale
Retail
Meals, Restaurants and Hotels
Financials, Banking, Insurance
and Real Estate
Others

Vol on ln(Indgap1)

Magnitude

Coefficient

Industry Tournament Incentives

of the tournament are narrowed to encompass only the most relevant CEO
positions. Table 9 presents the results. For both firm performance and risktaking, the coefficient on predicted ln(Indgap1) using narrower industries
(FF48) is approximately the same as the coefficient using broader industries
(FF17). We interpret the results as consistent with the notion that both industryspecific and general human capital are relevant for defining the boundaries of
the managerial labor market for external tournament incentives.

5. Conclusions
Empiricists have focused on executive wealth-performance sensitivity since the
early 1990s (Jensen and Murphy 1990, Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles 1993), on
executive risk-taking incentives starting 10 years later (Guay 1999; Rogers
2002; Coles Daniel, and Naveen 2006), and, more recently, on internal
tournament incentives for executives (Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009;
Kini and Williams 2012; Burns, Minnick, and Starks 2017). In this paper,
we have conceptually and empirically extended the literature on executive
incentives to assess industry tournament incentives external to the firm.
Consistent with the predictions of tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen
1981), empirical measures of CEO industry tournament incentives have
substantial power to explain firm performance, risk, investment policy, and
financial policy. The estimated incentive effects of the CEO external pay gap on
47 We are grateful to Nagpurnanand Prabhala for discussions that elucidated this idea. See Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce

(2006) for a related discussion based on internal and external labor markets for football coaches.
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4.4 Are the internal and external tournaments symbiotic?
In an internal rank-order tournament among executives for the CEO position,
the potential for promotion provides managers with an incentive to provide
more productive input. One difficulty, however, with the internal horse-race
model is that it need not be time-consistent. Once a well-qualified, effective
executive has assumed the CEO position, absent outside options the likelihood
that one of the other NEOs will become CEO in the near or medium term is
substantially reduced. There would be no immediate reason for the company
to dislodge the winner of the horse race, in which case any internal tournament
incentives going forward would be significantly diminished. Our conjecture
is that it is precisely because of the presence of the external tournament
that internal tournament incentives have power. While the firm would want
to retain an effective, high-ability CEO, such a CEO is likely to depart
when offered a significantly better outside opportunity, in which case the
internal horse race is still on, thereby providing significant internal tournament
incentives. Accordingly, we surmise that the internal and external tournaments
are “supermodular,” insofar as they reinforce the incentive properties of one
another.47
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Table 9
Industry tournament incentives based on FF17 versus FF48
Dependent variable and industry definition
Explanatory variables

q
FF17

FF48

Vol
FF17

Predicted ln(Indgap1)

0.189∗∗∗

0.178∗∗∗

0.150∗∗∗

CEO delta

0.164∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.485∗
(0.255)
0.002
(0.006)
0.010
(0.006)
−0.025
(0.035)
−0.713
(1.119)
−0.006
(0.017)
0.001
(0.023)
0.134∗∗∗
(0.018)

1.049
(1.661)
−0.101∗
(0.052)

0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.379∗∗∗
(0.126)
2.474∗∗∗
(0.619)
−0.193∗∗∗
(0.036)

0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.350∗∗∗
(0.126)
2.388∗∗∗
(0.620)
−0.180∗∗∗
(0.044)

Yes
Yes
15,128
0.190

Yes
Yes
14,694
0.154

Yes
Yes
13,128
0.366

1.973
30.05∗∗∗
369.36∗∗∗

1.627
34.37∗∗∗
372.63∗∗∗

1.902
33.55∗∗∗
287.89∗∗∗

(0.023)
0.185∗∗
(0.088)

0.070∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.379∗∗∗
(0.076)
−0.150∗∗∗
(0.047)
−0.406
(1.116)
0.985∗∗∗
(0.056)
0.080
(0.056)
−0.243
(0.551)
1.627∗∗∗
(0.573)
0.047
(0.354)

0.074∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.342∗∗∗
(0.071)
−0.150∗∗∗
(0.044)
−0.429
(1.124)
0.955∗∗∗
(0.055)
0.078
(0.056)
−0.094
(0.546)
1.756∗∗∗
(0.556)
0.091
(0.355)

ln(Total assets)
ln(CEO tenure)
ln(CEO age)
Stock return (1 yr)
Sales growth
FCF
R&D
Capital investment

1.685
(1.832)
−0.108∗∗
(0.044)

q

Book leverage
Industry stock return vol
ln(Ind # CEOs)

Year dummy
CEO-firm fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Endogeneity, relevance,
and overidentification
Hansen J -test
Hausman exogeneity test
First-stage F -statistics

Yes
Yes
12,694
0.338

1.628
36.44∗∗∗
278.77∗∗∗

This table presents GMM IV regressions (second stage only) of firm performance and risk on industry tournament
incentives using alternative industry classifications. The sample covers all ExecuComp firms, excluding financials
and utility firms, from 1992 to 2005. Columns 1 and 3 are based on Fama French’s 17 industries classifications
(FF17) Columns 2 and 4 are based on Fama French’s 48 industries classifications (FF48). The dependent variables
are q and Vol. Vol =100 x Stock return vol, where Stock return vol is the standard deviation of one year of daily stock
returns in year t+ 1. Indgap1 is the pay gap between the second-highest-paid CEO’s total compensation within
the same Fama-French 30 industries classification and the CEO’s total compensation. Table A1 (the appendix)
defines all other incentive variables and control variables. We include year and CEO-firm fixed effects in all
specifications. Firm-clustered and Newey-West-corrected (up to four lags) standard errors are in parentheses
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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(0.021)
0.486∗
(0.252)
0.007∗
(0.004)
0.003
(0.006)
−0.053
(0.034)
−0.795
(1.107)
−0.015
(0.016)
0.002
(0.023)
0.150∗∗∗
(0.021)

(0.026)
0.226∗∗
(0.108)

CEO vega
ln(Firm gap)

FF48

Industry Tournament Incentives
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q, firm risk, and policy choices are statistically and economically significant.
Moreover, the incentive effects of the industry pay gap are larger when the
aspiring executive has a higher probability of winning the tournament and
obtaining the prize. We also have found that the magnitude of the effects of
the industry pay gap varies across industries and through time. Our results
are robust to using 2SLS IV rather than GMM IV, using different industry
definitions and time fixed effects, and controlling for the industry size gap,
CEO pay slice, and measures of CEO talent and entrenchment. The results are
stronger when we use industry fixed effects, rather than CEO-firm fixed effects.
This study has deployed performance-on-structure and structure-on-structure
regression analysis. Herein, structure has encompassed various aspects of the
organization, including internal and external tournament incentives, CEO delta
and vega, financial policy, and investment policy. We have found, among other
results, that performance, measured by Tobin’s q, increases in both internal and
external tournament incentives. The logical question arises as to why all firms
do not increase these incentives and, thereby, increase firm value and q. Of
course, if firms had done so, then we would not have observed the data that
give rise to the estimated positive relation in the first place.
At least two explanations for a relation between performance and structure
are possible (e.g., Coles, Lemmon, and Wang 2011). One is that the observed
positive relation represents equilibrium covariation driven by one or more
omitted variables. We have taken considerable measures to eliminate this
explanation, including the use of instruments, CEO-firm fixed effects, and
numerous control variables. A second potential explanation is that transaction
costs, including those arising from other organizational considerations, prevent
frictionless adjustment by firms of executive pay. In this case, the empirical
estimates reflect an upward-sloping segment of the relation between firm value
and the external tournament prize. The argument is particularly plausible for
the external pay gap, because a firm has little control over the compensation and
perquisites offered at other companies, such as the firm that provides maximal
or near-maximal pay. For pay of the CEO at one’s own firm, the firm can be
constrained by internal considerations, such as contract design for optimal delta
incentives and ideal internal tournament incentives, as well as equity concerns
among the executive team. Moreover, the costs of moving or reassignment can
imply that a firm need not respond to external opportunities to retain the CEO.
The idea of industry tournament incentives likely extends beyond CEOs to
other named executive officers. Just as CEOs appear to be motivated by the
possibility of being promoted to another firm in the same industry with higher
compensation, so would other executives who possess discretion and influence
over firm assets. Indeed, in our sample, 56.7% of new CEOs were not CEO at
their prior firm. Though the external industry pay gap is likely to underestimate
the size of the tournament prize for non-CEO NEOs (which would be the sum
of the external pay gap and the internal pay gap), it is plausible that some of the
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substantial effects on firm performance and risk we estimate arise from external
tournament incentives for those executives.

Appendix
Table A1
Data sources and definitions
Variable

Source

Definition

Indgap1 ($000)

ExecuComp

Indgap2 ($000)

ExecuComp

Firm gap ($000)

ExecuComp

CEO delta (per $1)

ExecuComp

CEO vega ($000)

ExecuComp

CEO total comp
($000)

ExecuComp

The pay gap between the second-highest-paid CEO’s
total compensation within the same Fama-French
30-industry classification and the CEO’s total
compensation
The pay gap between the second-highest-paid CEO’s
total compensation in the same industry (FF30)
and size group and the CEO’s total compensation
The pay gap between CEO’s total compensation and
the median VP total compensation
(Shares owned at the beginning of the year + Average
delta of prior option grants × No. of
options)/Number of shares outstanding
The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01
change in standard deviation of stock returns
Salary + bonus + restricted stock grants + option
grants + LTIP + other annual payments

Incentives

ExecuComp
ExecuComp
ExecuComp

Retire CEO

ExecuComp

Founder

ExecuComp

The number of years as the firm’s CEO
The CEO’s age in the sample year
A dummy variable = 1 in the CEO’s first year of
service as CEO, and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable = 1 if the CEO’s age is more than
65 years, and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable = 1 if the CEO is the founder,
defined by if the CEO’s tenure reported in
ExecuComp indicates that the CEO held that
position prior to the firm’s first listing on CRSP,
and 0 otherwise

Industry characteristics
Ind # CEOs

ExecuComp

Industry mobility

ExecuComp

Industry talent

ExecuComp

H-index Industry
homogeneity

ExecuComp
CRSP

Industry stock return
vol

CRSP

The number of CEOs (and firms) within the same
industry in the sample year
The unconditional probability of CEO departure in
each industry in the sample year
The percentage of insider CEOs in the industry in the
sample year
The industry Herfindahl index of firm sales, the sum
of the square of segment sales divided by the
square of firm sales in the sample year Mean
partial correlation between firm’s returns and an
equally weighted industry index for all firms with
the same Fama-French 30 industry code holding
market return constant with prior 60 monthly
returns.
The average volatility of all firms within the same
industry based on daily returns in the prior year
(continued)
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CEO characteristics
CEO tenure
CEO age
New CEO

Industry Tournament Incentives

Table A1
Continued
Variable

Source

Definition

q

Compustat

ROE

Compustat

Stock return vol
EBITDA vol

CRSP
Compustat

R&D

Compustat

CAPEX
# segments

Compustat
Compustat

Total assets
Sales

Compustat
Compustat

Book leverage

Compustat

Stock return 1 yr
Sales growth
Capital investment

Compustat
Compustat
Compustat

FCF

Compustat

CEO pay slice

ExecuComp

The ratio of the sum of market value of equity and the
book value of debt to total assets
Return on equity per share, calculated as net income
divided by shareholder equity
Variance of one year of daily stock returns
Cash flow volatility is the seasonally adjusted
standard deviation of quarterly EBITDA divided
by total assets from year t through year t+ 4
R&D expenditures divided by total assets, = 0 if “not
material” or missing
Capital expenditures divided by total assets
The number of operating segments as reported in
Compustat segment database
Total assets
Sales (net of returns, discounts, rebates, and
allowances for missing and damaged goods)
Book leverage = interest-bearing debt divided by
total assets
One-year stock return
The average sales growth over years t−4 through t−1
Investment in property, plant, and equipment divided
by total assets
Free cash flow = (operating income before
depreciation − interest expense − income taxes
minus cash dividends − capital expenditure) /
total assets
Fraction of aggregate compensation of the top-five
executives captured by CEO

Firm characteristics

ExecuComp
Compustat

Ind CEO comp
($000,000)

ExecuComp

The average total compensation received by all other
CEOs who work at firms in a different industry
which are headquartered within a 250-km radius
of the firm
The sum of total compensation of all other CEOs in
each industry (or size-based half industry), except
the highest-paid CEO
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